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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the impact of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil and the subsequent recession 
on the economies of southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries. The major effects 
on the economies of this region have come 
through transmission channels associated 
with the real economy, i.e. the global recession. 
These are, in particular, declines in exports, 
oil revenues, tourism receipts, remittances 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂ  ows, 
with the drop in exports so far appearing to 
have had the strongest impact. As a result, 
real GDP growth has weakened in the wake of 
the global crisis. However, the weakening of 
economic activity in the Mediterranean region 
has been less pronounced than in advanced 
economies and most other emerging market 
regions. The main reason for this is that the 
direct impact of the global ﬁ  nancial  turmoil 
on banking sectors and ﬁ   nancial markets in 
Mediterranean countries has been relatively 
limited. This is mainly due to (i) their lack of 
exposure to US mortgage-related assets that 
turned “toxic”, a feature the region shares with 
other emerging markets, and (ii) the limited 
ﬁ  nancial development of many countries in the 
region and their limited integration into global 
ﬁ   nancial markets, a feature that distinguishes 
the region from other emerging markets and, 
in particular, from the euro area’s neighbours to 
the east. Notwithstanding the relative resilience 
of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
in the wake of the global crisis, the region 
faces signiﬁ  cant challenges. In particular, many 
countries need signiﬁ  cantly higher growth rates 
to address the employment challenge posed as a 
consequence of demographic developments.
Keywords: Global economic crisis, Mediterranean 
countries, ﬁ  nancial sector, international spillovers.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: R11, E60, G21.5
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After years of robust economic performance 
in the Mediterranean region, resulting from 
both a benign global backdrop and progress in 
structural reforms in many southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries, the global economic 
environment began to pose difﬁ   culties for the 
region in the second half of 2008 and 2009, 
in the wake of the intensiﬁ   cation of global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil and the subsequent global 
recession. The region has mainly been affected 
by the global recession rather than by the direct 
impact of global ﬁ  nancial turmoil. All countries 
have been adversely affected by the crisis, but to 
varying degrees, and the Mediterranean region 
as a whole has been less affected than advanced 
economies and other emerging market regions, 
in particular central, eastern and south-eastern 
Europe. 
The major effects of global developments on 
the economies of the Mediterranean region have 
come through transmission channels associated 
with the real economy. Declines in exports, 
oil revenues, tourism revenues, remittances 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows have 
been the major channels. As a result, real GDP 
growth in the region weakened signiﬁ  cantly 
in 2009. However, growth has remained positive 
in almost all the Mediterranean countries and is 
also projected to be higher than that in advanced 
economies and many other emerging market 
regions in 2010. 
A positive side effect of the global crisis 
throughout the region has been the signiﬁ  cant 
fall in inﬂ  ation, which had spiked in 2007 and 
2008 and constituted its main macroeconomic 
challenge until mid-2008. As food accounts for 
a large proportion of many countries’ consumer 
price index (CPI) baskets, the decline of global 
food prices has been a major factor in easing 
pressures on real incomes.
Budget balances have weakened in the region, 
most notably in oil-exporting countries, 
as a result of the sharp drop in oil prices. 
In non-oil-exporting Mediterranean countries 
ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cits have increased, but not as 
signiﬁ  cantly as in advanced economies. This 
is because of the less pronounced economic 
slowdown in Mediterranean non-oil-exporting 
countries, the relative weakness of automatic 
stabilisers and the decline in expenditure on 
oil and food subsidies after the fall in global 
commodity prices. The large current account 
surpluses of the major oil-exporting countries 
in the region have plummeted as a result of the 
drop in oil prices, while the current account 
balances of most non-oil-exporting countries 
have remained broadly stable or slightly 
strengthened. The decline in imports due to 
lower oil prices and weaker domestic demand 
has outweighed the drop in exports resulting 
from lower external demand. The large 
expansion of oil-exporting countries’ foreign 
exchange reserves has come to a halt.
The main reasons for the limited direct spillover 
from global ﬁ  nancial developments to ﬁ  nancial 
sectors in the Mediterranean region are 
(i) the almost complete lack of exposure of 
their  ﬁ   nancial institutions to mortgage-related 
US securities that turned “toxic”, and (ii) the 
generally limited integration of these countries 
into global ﬁ  nancial markets.  
The most direct and immediate impact has been 
on stock markets in the region, which since 
mid-2008 have been plummeting broadly in line 
with global markets, owing to the increase in 
risk aversion and the weakening in support from 
the regional recycling of oil revenues. However, 
given the limited importance of capital markets 
in most countries, whose ﬁ  nancial systems are 
mainly bank-based, the impact of stock market 
ﬂ   uctuations on the overall economy tends 
to be limited.
The sharp fall in cross-border lending of 
banks reporting to the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), a key feature of the 
“post-Lehman” global ﬁ  nancial landscape, has 
been less pronounced in Mediterranean countries 
than at the global level, and overall dependence 
on ﬁ  nancing from BIS-reporting banks is low. 
As in most advanced and emerging market 6
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economies, a slowdown of credit extension 
to the private sector has been observed in 
Mediterranean countries, while bank lending to 
the public sector has increased. This increase in 
bank credit to the public sector can be attributed 
to the increased ﬁ   nancing requirements of 
governments and, in some cases, the withdrawal 
of non-residents from domestic Treasury bill 
(T-bill) markets. Deposit growth has been stable, 
and some countries have even beneﬁ  ted from the 
global crisis, as the perception of risk in their 
domestic banking systems changed favourably 
in comparison with that in advanced countries’ 
banking sectors. The global ﬁ  nancial turmoil has, 
in some Mediterranean countries, slowed down 
the privatisation process in the banking sector. 
The main economic risk for the region is a weak 
and uneven recovery of the global economy. 
Economic developments in the European 
Union (EU) are of particular importance to the 
region, given the close economic and ﬁ  nancial 
links of most of its countries with the northern 
shore of the Mediterranean. Notwithstanding 
the relative resilience of southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries in the wake of the 
global crisis, three issues could pose particular 
challenges if economic activity were to remain 
weak over a protracted period: (i) while the real 
GDP growth rates exhibited by Mediterranean 
countries in the wake of the global recession 
are positive, and higher than those in advanced 
economies and some other emerging market 
economies, they are still too subdued to address 
the signiﬁ  cant employment challenges that many 
Mediterranean countries face over the medium 
term in view of a rapidly growing labour 
force and already high unemployment levels; 
(ii) a protracted slowdown in Mediterranean 
economies may cause non-performing loans to 
rise and add to pre-existing vulnerabilities of 
the banking sectors in several countries, namely 
an already large stock of impaired assets; and 
(iii) given high debt levels, most countries in 
the region – in particular the non-oil-exporting 
countries – have hardly any room for manoeuvre 
in further sustaining domestic demand with ﬁ  scal 
policy measures. Furthermore, the means by 
which monetary policy can respond are limited, 
owing to, inter alia, exchange rate regimes and 
still relatively high inﬂ  ation in some countries.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the impact of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil and the subsequent recession 1 
on Mediterranean countries’ economies.2 The 
global  ﬁ   nancial turmoil that erupted in 
August 2007 originated in the United States, 
with the sub-prime mortgage market as its 
epicentre. In September 2008, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, it signiﬁ  cantly intensiﬁ  ed 
and became a global ﬁ  nancial crisis. The turmoil 
has been characterised by immediate and 
substantial spillovers from ﬁ  nancial 
developments in the United States to ﬁ  nancial 
markets and banking sectors in other advanced 
economies, by a loss of conﬁ   dence and by 
negative feedback loops between the ﬁ  nancial 
sector and the real economy, resulting in a 
global recession. While at the beginning of the 
turmoil emerging market and developing 
economies appeared to have been decoupled 
from the economic downturn occurring in 
advanced economies, it became increasingly 
evident that such a decoupling was illusionary, 
owing to the intensity of the downturn, the 
collapse in global trade and the fall in commodity 
prices. Accordingly, the interconnected nature 
of the global economy led to a sharp and 
synchronised global downturn.
The direct impact of global developments on 
emerging market economies has, however, 
differed signiﬁ   cantly between regions. In the 
neighbourhood of the euro area, spillovers to 
central and eastern Europe, and to the countries 
belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), have been particularly substantial. 
By contrast, the euro area’s neighbours in the 
south have been less affected. 
The major effects on the economies of the 
Mediterranean region have thus far come 
through transmission channels associated with 
the real economy, i.e. the global recession. 
These are, notably, declines in exports, oil 
revenues, tourism receipts, remittances and 
inﬂ  ows of foreign direct investment (FDI), with 
the drop in exports so far appearing to have had 
the strongest and most direct impact. As a result, 
real GDP growth weakened signiﬁ  cantly in 2009 
and is projected to recover only moderately in 
2010. However, the weakening of economic 
activity in the Mediterranean region has been 
less pronounced than in advanced economies 
and most other emerging market regions. 
The main reason is that, overall, the direct 
impact of the global  ﬁ  nancial  turmoil on 
banking sectors and ﬁ   nancial markets in 
Mediterranean countries has been relatively 
limited. This can mainly be attributed to (i) their 
lack of exposure to US mortgage-related assets 
that turned “toxic”, a feature the region shares 
with other emerging markets, and (ii) the limited 
ﬁ  nancial development of many countries in the 
region and their limited integration into global 
ﬁ  nancial markets, a feature which distinguishes 
the region from other emerging markets, and in 
particular from the euro area’s neighbours in the 
east. The latter largely explains the difference 
between the economic performance in the 
Mediterranean countries and that in some other 
emerging markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the impact of the 
global  ﬁ   nancial turmoil and recession on 
macroeconomic developments in Mediterranean 
countries. Section 3 analyses the impact on the 
region’s banking sectors and ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Section 4 provides a conclusion. 
Macroeconomic analysis is based mainly on IMF (2010a), WEO  1 
data of April 2010. Financial market data are as of 1 May 2010.
The economies covered are those of: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,  2 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza. These are the partners, 
or observers, in the EU’s Barcelona process, now known as 
the Union for the Mediterranean, which are not EU candidates 
or potential candidates. Albania, which joined the Barcelona 
Process in December 2007, alongside Mauritania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro, which became part of the 
reformed Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008, and Turkey, 
which has been a partner of the Barcelona process since its 
inception, are not covered in the paper as they are EU candidates 
or potential candidates. Monaco, which also joined the Union for 
the Mediterranean in July 2008, is also not covered as it does not 
have a central bank, nor a monetary and exchange rate policy 
of its own.8
ECB
Occasional Paper No 118
August 2010
2  THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
TURMOIL AND RECESSION ON 
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1  TRANSMISSION CHANNELS THROUGH 
WHICH GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE 
AFFECTED THE REAL ECONOMY 
OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
The Mediterranean countries are largely 
heterogeneous in terms of their economic 
features, not only in terms of their natural 
resources but also in terms of population, 
size, economic structure and income level 
(Table 1). Economic developments are often 
driven by various country-speciﬁ  c  factors 
and policies.
Box 1
LINKS BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
The re-launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 
highlighted the signiﬁ  cance of Mediterranean countries for Europe’s economic and political 
environment. With more than 200 million inhabitants, the region is almost two-thirds the size 
of the euro area, where nationals of Mediterranean countries account for a large proportion of 
(non-EU27) immigrants, namely for about 14% of the immigrant (non-EU27) population in euro 
area countries.1
As regards trade ties, the Mediterranean region is one of Europe’s largest energy suppliers, 
accounting for 16.4% of the euro area’s imports of oil, gas, and mineral fuels in 2009. Its share 
of total euro area exports was about 5%. However, for euro area countries on the Mediterranean 
shore, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, Mediterranean countries are of even greater importance 
as regards trade: in 2009 their Mediterranean neighbours provided 26.4% of their non-euro area 
energy imports and received almost 10% of their total non-euro area exports. 
In terms of ﬁ  nancial links, the overall exposure of the euro area to the Mediterranean region is 
low when compared with neighbouring regions in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe. 
However, the ﬁ  nancial exposure to Mediterranean countries matters for individual euro area 
countries, and for France in particular. Around 18% of France’s outstanding cross-border loans 
to developing countries are to Mediterranean economies. 
From a southern Mediterranean perspective, the euro area/EU is by far their largest partner 
as regards trade relations, tourism, bank lending and remittances from migrants in the 
euro area/EU.2 
1 This  ﬁ  gure excludes statistics for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, France and Luxembourg, for which Eurostat does not provide a breakdown 
by citizenship). If Turkey was included, the ﬁ  gure would rise to 41%.
2  See ECB (2004).9
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2   THE IMPACT 
OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
AND RECESSION ON 
MACROECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENTS
In general, Mediterranean countries are small, 
open economies with close ties to euro area 
countries (see Box 1). Many of them have large 
tourism sectors and beneﬁ   t from expatriates’ 
remittances. Over the last few years, many have 
attracted signiﬁ   cant FDI inﬂ  ows,  particularly 
when compared with previous decades. Some 
of them are large oil exporters. Accordingly, 
they are vulnerable to declines in exports, oil 
revenues, tourism receipts, remittances and FDI 
inﬂ  ows (see Table 2). As a result of the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil and recession, declines in 
these sources of revenue can be observed, albeit 
to a varying degree, depending on category 
and country. The drop in exports is the most 
substantial and direct channel through which 
the global crisis has affected the region, and the 
fall in FDI inﬂ  ows also appears to be signiﬁ  cant, 
while remittances, judging by past experience, 
tend to be a relatively stable source of revenue.
Table 2 Exposure to the main transmission channels of the global recession
(percentages)






Inﬂ  ows of 
remittances/GNI  2)
Foreign direct 
investment inﬂ  ows/GDP
(2009) (2009)  (2009)  (2008)  (2007-2009) 
Algeria 34.1  92.3  2.0  1.3  1.3 
Egypt 25.0  16.8  7.4  5.4  7.0 
Israel 34.6  0.0  2.7  0.7  4.2 
Jordan 47.7  0.0  9.0  17.9  11.5 
Lebanon 72.2  0.0  12.5  24.5  11.5 
Libya 64.5  93.5  1.7  0.0  5.5 
Mauritania 49.8  14.1  ..  0.1  4.4 
Morocco 29.0  1.1  7.7  7.8  4.3 
Syria 31.7  20.9  5.1  1.5  2.5 
Tunisia 49.4  9.8  9.2  4.9  5.2 
West Bank and Gaza  3) 12.0 ..  ..  14.9  .. 
Sources: IMF and 1) World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), 2) World Bank, Global Development Finance Indicators (2008), 3) 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), data for 2008.
Table 1 Basic economic indicators
Population  Population growth  Nominal GDP  GDP per capita  Trade openness  2) 
(millions) (average  annual 
growth rates) 
(USD billions)  (USD, purchasing 
power parity)
(goods and services, 
percentage of GDP) 
(2008) (2002-2008)  (2008)  (2008)  (2008) 
Algeria 34.8  1.6  159.7  6,698  69.0 
Egypt 75.0  2.2  162.2  5,898  75.3 
Israel 7.1  2.0  201.8  28,206  81.9 
Jordan 5.9  2.3  20.0  5,314  148.8 
Lebanon 3.8  0.8  28.9  13,032  182.2 
Libya 6.2  2.0  100.1  14,533  94.1 
Mauritania 3.0  2.4  3.2  2,052  82.0 
Morocco 31.4  1.2  86.4  4,349  90.3 
Syria 19.9  2.5  54.8  4,749  74.8 
Tunisia 10.3  1.0  40.3  7,963  114.8 
West Bank and Gaza  1) 3.8  …  6.5  1,710  83.2 
Mediterranean 201.3  1.8 863.9  6,932  … 
Memorandum items:
euro area  322.5  0.6  13,635.2  33,081  44.6 
Sources: IMF, ESA95 and ECB staff calculations.
1) 2008 data for West Bank and Gaza are estimates. GDP per capita in USD.
2) 2007 data for Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and 2006 data for Mauritania and Syria.10
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Exports from all Mediterranean countries have 
declined sharply since mid-2008 when the global 
economy entered into a synchronised downturn 
and global trade contracted signiﬁ  cantly 
(see Chart 1). The fall in exports has been most 
pronounced in the oil-exporting countries of the 
region (Algeria, Libya and Syria). In addition to 
the decline in oil demand that resulted from the 
global recession, export (and ﬁ  scal)  revenues 
of oil-exporting countries have been hit by the 
sharp and sudden fall in oil prices, which began 
in July 2008. However, the drop in exports has 
also been very pronounced for non-oil-exporting 
countries in the region. Figures for Morocco, 
Israel and Tunisia show that most of their 
exports are bound for regions that were very 
severely hit by the crisis (Morocco and Tunisia 
export mainly to the EU. Israel exports mainly 
to the EU and the United States). Between 2008 
and 2009, almost all Mediterranean countries 
registered a more signiﬁ  cant drop in exports to 
the EU than in overall exports, which highlighted 
the depth of the recession in Europe. The EU is 
the major export market for most Mediterranean 
countries (see Chart 2), while the role of the 
United States – bar its trade ties with Israel, 
Jordan and Algeria (oil) – is only marginal. 
The tourism sectors in several Mediterranean 
countries have been negatively affected by the 
crisis, as economic strains in the countries of 
origin have led to a re-consideration of travel plans 
(and budgets). However, data on tourist arrivals 
in 2009 show a mixed picture (see Table 3). 
Reductions were observed in Israel, Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia. In other countries tourism 
continued to grow, although tourism receipts 
in some countries, such as Morocco, declined 
despite a higher number of tourist arrivals, as 
visitors reduced their spending and the length 
of their stay. Some Mediterranean destinations 
may indeed beneﬁ   t from switching effects in 
the wake of the crisis (customers moving away 
from higher-cost to lower-cost destinations). The 
high growth ﬁ  gure for Lebanon is due to a base 
effect, as tourist arrivals were exceptionally low 









































Sources: Haver Analytics, IMF (DOTS) and ECB staff 
calculations.
Chart 2 Mediterranean countries’ exports 
to the EU and the United States



















exports to the United States












Sources: Haver Analytics, IMF (DOTS) and ECB staff calculations.
Note: Data refer to 2009.11
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2   THE IMPACT 
OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
AND RECESSION ON 
MACROECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENTS
in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 as a result of the difﬁ  cult 
domestic political situation, which started to ease 
with the Doha Agreement of May 2008. 
Most tourists visiting Mediterranean countries 
come from the EU; however, in some countries, 
a signiﬁ   cant proportion of tourism revenue 
is also generated by visitors from Arab Gulf 
countries, notably in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and 
Egypt. Visitors from these countries seem to 
have been a stabilising factor for tourism sectors. 
While the Gulf region has also been adversely 
affected by the global ﬁ   nancial turmoil and 
recession, mainly through the sharp drop in oil 
prices, economic strains have been less severe 
than in advanced and most emerging market 
economies. As regards tourism originating 
from the EU, the prospects for Mediterranean 
countries very much depend on how the path 
of economic recovery pans out on the northern 
shore of the Mediterranean Sea. 
Remittances, which are an important source of 
revenue for some countries in the Mediterranean 
region, may be adversely affected by the crisis 
if expatriates who send money home become 
unemployed or have less secure income 
prospects, and thus reduce their transfers. 
The World Bank estimates that remittances to 
developing countries declined by 6.0% 
worldwide in 2009, with the fall somewhat more 
signiﬁ   cant for countries in the Mediterranean 
(see Chart 3). The decline is estimated to have 
been particularly pronounced in Morocco and 
Egypt, where migrant workers were hit by 
deteriorating labour market conditions in Europe 
and the United States in the wake of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil. Remittances are by far most 
important for Lebanon, Jordan and for the West 
Bank and Gaza. In Lebanon and Jordan, they 
are crucial to the covering of large current 
account deﬁ  cits (see Sub-section 2.5). The bulk 
of remittances received by Mediterranean 
countries originate in the EU (in particular, in 
the case of the Maghreb countries), in the Gulf 
region (mainly eastern Mediterranean countries) 
and, in some cases, also the United States 
(Egypt). Key risks for remittances in the wake 
of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil are: a sluggish 
recovery in the countries of origin; adverse 
movements of exchange rates (a weakening of 
the exchange rates of the currencies of the 
countries of origin vis-à-vis those of destination 
countries); and more restrictive immigration/
labour market policies in major countries of 
origin (if unemployment rises). However, 
compared with other sources of external revenue 
such as tourism receipts or FDI inﬂ  ows, 
remittances tend to be relatively stable over 
time, and are less sensitive to ﬂ  uctuations that 
reﬂ  ect economic strains either in the country of 
origin or in the destination country.3 
For further discussion, see World Bank (2010), Box 1. 3 
Table 3 Growth in tourist arrivals in 2009
(percentages)
Algeria -6.7  Mauritania  … 
Egypt -3.5  Morocco  5.8 
Israel -10.2  Syria  11.5 
Jordan 0.6  Tunisia  -2.0 
Lebanon  46.5  West Bank and Gaza …
Libya 10.4 
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC).
Chart 3 Growth in flows of remittances 
























11  West Bank and Gaza
12  Mediterranean countries
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Sources: World Bank estimates and ECB staff calculations.12
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For FDI inﬂ  ows, projections point to a fall of 
around one-third in comparison with previous 
years (see Chart 4). While FDI inﬂ  ows  are 
therefore likely to be lower than in the record 
years from 2006 to 2008, when inﬂ  ows 
for the region as a whole reached around 
USD 40 billion, they are expected to be higher 
than the levels recorded in the ﬁ  rst half of the 
decade. Furthermore, portfolio investment 
positions (i.e. portfolio debt and equity inﬂ  ows) 
were subdued in 2008 (see Chart 5). However, 
this transmission channel has been less 
important in Mediterranean economies than 
in other emerging markets, owing to the low 
overall degree of global ﬁ  nancial  integration 
and remaining restrictions on stock ownership 
in some countries. In 2008, large outﬂ  ows 
of portfolio investment could be observed in 
Egypt, where buoyant stock market growth had 
attracted speculative capital inﬂ  ows prior to the 
crisis and foreigners withdrew from the local 
T-bill market (see also Sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
2.2  GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT
After the robust performance of past years, real 
GDP growth in the Mediterranean region fell 
signiﬁ  cantly as a result of the global recession 
in 2009. However, growth remained positive 
in all countries of the region bar Mauritania, 
and is also projected to be higher than that in 
advanced economies and many other emerging 
market regions in 2010. Stabilising factors 
have been the relatively limited direct impact 
of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil on their ﬁ  nancial 
sectors, as well as, in some cases, close links to 
oil-exporting countries in the Gulf region. 
However, the lower growth rates experienced 






































Note: No data available for West Bank and Gaza.
1) Projections.
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in the wake of the global turmoil, if protracted, 
would not be sufﬁ   cient to address the 
signiﬁ   cant employment challenges faced 
by many Mediterranean countries over the 
medium term.
GROWTH
Real GDP growth in the Mediterranean region 
slowed down signiﬁ  cantly in 2009, compared 
with the robust growth rates of the last 
few years, and is projected to recover 
moderately in 2010 (see Table 4). However, 
unlike in advanced economies and many other 
emerging market regions, average growth in the 
Mediterranean in 2009 remained positive 
at 3.5%, with growth in the region’s oil-
exporting countries remaining lower than in 
non-oil-exporting countries. Of all emerging 
market regions, Mediterranean countries display 
the best growth performance in relative terms 
after emerging/developing Asia, although at a 
much lower level than Asia. In particular, 
economic activity has been more resilient than 
in central and eastern Europe and the CIS, i.e. 
other emerging market regions in the broad 
neighbourhood of the euro area that have been 
much more severely hit by the fallout of the 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis and recession. This is also 
reﬂ  ected in the fact that no country from the 
region has turned to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) as a result of the crisis.4 
There are a number of possible reasons for this 
relative resilience: ﬁ  rst and foremost, there has 
been hardly any direct spillover from the global 
ﬁ  nancial market turmoil to the ﬁ  nancial sectors 
of Mediterranean countries (see Section 3 for 
a detailed analysis). This is mainly due to the 
low degree of integration of many countries in 
the region into global ﬁ  nancial markets. Thus, 
negative feedback loops between the ﬁ  nancial 
sector and the real economy are not signiﬁ  cant, 
although there is a risk that such loops might 
increase if the slowdown in economic activity 
is protracted.
For several non-oil-exporting countries 
in the region, mainly those in the eastern 
Mediterranean, the close economic and ﬁ  nancial 
links to oil-exporting countries in the Gulf 
seem to have been a stabilising factor in the 
current situation. Large reserves accumulated 
in previous years allowed Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries to sustain their public 
spending, so that tourism revenues, remittances, 
FDI inﬂ   ows and portfolio investment inﬂ  ows 
from this source to Mediterranean economies 
were less affected by the crisis than those 
originating in advanced economies. 
The major oil-exporting countries in the 
Mediterranean region, Algeria and Libya, have 
also beneﬁ  ted from large reserves accumulated 
Lebanon is the only country in the region with an IMF  4 
programme (Emergency Post-Conﬂ   ict Assistance launched in 
May 2007 after the 2006 war, i.e. a programme not related to 
the global ﬁ  nancial crisis). Mauritania’s Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, which was launched in 2006 and is due to expire 
in 2009, was suspended after a coup d’ état in October 2008. 
A new programme has been requested by the government.













Total Oil 2) Non-oil 3)
2008 5.3  3.2 6.1 5.5 3.0  5.5  7.9 4.3 
2009 3.5  2.4 3.9 2.1 -3.7  -6.6 6.6 -1.8 
2010 1) 4.5  4.8 4.3 4.7 2.8  4.0  8.7 4.0 
2011 1) 4.8  4.9 4.8 5.9 3.4  3.6  8.7 4.0 
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Averages weighted by GDP in purchasing power parities.
1) Projections. 
2) Oil exporters: Algeria, Libya, Syria.
3) Non-oil exporters: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.14
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during years of high oil prices. They can 
sustain high levels of public spending in 
spite of the sharp drop in oil prices (see also 
Sub-section 2.4). 
Countries with large and long-standing ﬁ  scal 
and current account deﬁ   cits, most notably 
Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza 
(see Sub-sections 2.4 and 2.5), could be 
considered particularly vulnerable when 
the global ﬁ   nancial turmoil intensiﬁ  ed  in 
autumn 2008. However, their sources of 
external ﬁ  nancing proved relatively stable. This 
was partly attributable to the speciﬁ  c sources 
of ﬁ  nance themselves (Gulf countries, ofﬁ  cial 
donors, Lebanese diaspora), and partly to the 
fact that local/regional political events tend to 
be more important determinants of economic 
activity than global economic and ﬁ  nancial 
developments (for example, in Lebanon and in 
the West Bank and Gaza). 
Finally, the limited role of several countries of 
the region in advanced manufacturing – a sector 
highly affected by the global recession – and 
improved policies over previous years in a 
number of countries have contributed to the 
relative resilience of the Mediterranean region 
in the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil and 
recession.5
The main risk for economic activity in the 
Mediterranean countries lies in a potentially 
weak and uneven recovery of the global 
economy. In particular, an only sluggish 
recovery in the EU could take a further toll on 
growth in the region, given the close economic 
and ﬁ  nancial links of most of the countries there 
with the northern shore of the Mediterranean.
Another non-negligible risk is the possibility that 
volatile oil markets could drive oil prices either 
too low or too high. A sharp fall in oil prices 
would have an adverse effect on Mediterranean 
and Gulf oil-exporting countries and impede 
their ability to sustain public spending, with 
negative feedback loops to those Mediterranean 
countries that beneﬁ  t from close links to the Gulf. 
A sharp increase in oil prices driven by a global 
economic recovery and tight global oil markets 
would burden non-oil exporting countries’ ﬁ  scal 
and current accounts, would fuel inﬂ  ation and 
would prevent a return to higher growth rates.
Furthermore, while the growth rates projected 
for Mediterranean countries for 2010-11 are 
positive, and higher than those for advanced 
economies and for some other emerging market 
economies, they are generally too low to 
address the employment challenges facing most 
countries in the region (see below) or to support 
a catch-up in income levels (see Box 2).
As regards individual countries, there are some 
noteworthy developments. No country except 
Mauritania experienced negative real GDP 
growth in 2009, the year of the deepest global 
recession in many decades (see Chart 6). 
See IMF (2009a). 5 
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Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: 1) Projections. Mediterranean average weighted by GDP 
in PPP terms. Owing to the lack of data comparability, West 
Bank and Gaza are excluded from the average, and 2009 data 
are estimated.15
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Israel exhibited a very low growth rate by 
regional standards in 2009. This can be attributed 
to Israel’s close integration with advanced 
economies (the United States and the EU) 
and with global ﬁ   nancial markets. However, 
compared with other advanced economies, the 
country has been affected by the crisis only mildly, 
reﬂ   ecting the absence of major imbalances, 
a sound ﬁ   nancial sector and the enhanced 
credibility of its macroeconomic management in 
comparison with previous decades, all of which 
have contributed to the relative resilience of 
the economy. 
In the two major oil-exporting countries of the 
region, Algeria and Libya, oil GDP growth 
took a hit in 2009, on account of lower oil 
production in line with OPEC production cuts, 
whereas non-oil GDP growth remained robust 
(9.2% in Algeria and 6.0% in Libya), driven by 
the continuation of ambitious public spending 
programmes focused on developing the physical 
and social infrastructure (see Sub-section 2.4). 
Egypt exhibited a pronounced slowdown, as it 
has been affected by the crisis via multiple 
channels. In addition to exports, remittances and 
tourism, there has also been a negative impact on 
oil and Suez Canal revenues (owing to the drop 
in oil prices and in global trade). Nevertheless, 
real GDP growth in 2009 turned out to be 
higher than was widely expected in view of 
these exposures. Jordan has also experienced 
a signiﬁ  cant slowdown compared with its very 
high growth levels of previous years, owing to 
the multiplicity of transmission channels and, 
in particular, on account of the contraction in its 
ﬁ  nancial services sector. 
In some countries of the region, real GDP 
growth has been only moderately affected by 
global developments. In Lebanon, this can be 
attributed to the following: enhanced conﬁ  dence, 
as the domestic political tensions prevailing 
since 2006 have largely abated; the continuing 
reconstruction of areas affected by the 2006 
war (which also explains the high growth 
rates of 2007-08); and a low ratio of goods 
exports to GDP, which means that a drop in 
external demand has a relatively muted impact. 
In Morocco, a slowdown in non-agricultural 
output in response to global economic 
developments has been partially compensated 
for by exceptionally high agricultural output 
(which accounts for around 15% of GDP) 
as a result of favourable weather conditions 
(rain). Mauritania’s output, which has been 
volatile over the last few years, is determined 
by ﬂ  uctuations in the production levels of the 
mining sector and of the country’s nascent oil 
industry. Real GDP growth rates in Tunisia 
and Syria were somewhat, but not signiﬁ  cantly, 
lower in 2009 than in the previous year, also 
pointing to a relatively mild impact of global 
developments. In Tunisia, this was due partly to 
a major gas ﬁ  eld coming on stream. 
The West Bank and Gaza is a clear outlier 
as regards real GDP growth in 2009, as the 
economy there expanded by 6.8%, i.e. by the 
highest rate in the region and faster than 
in 2008. This is mainly due to the following: 
the area’s low base after several years of decline 
resulting from political and security-related 
circumstances; the gradual lifting of restrictions 
on mobility and access; and the improvement of 
the internal security situation in the West Bank. 
The impact of global economic developments 
has been negligible, as exports account 
for only slightly more than 10% of GDP 
(and are mainly bound for Israel). There is 
a signiﬁ   cant difference between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip: in the former, 
real GDP growth is estimated to have stood 
at 8.5% in 2009, compared with around 
1% in the latter. 
EMPLOYMENT
Unemployment rates remained stable in the 
Mediterranean region in 2009 and are not 
projected to increase signiﬁ   cantly in 2010 
(see Chart 7). This would appear to be a 
reﬂ   ection of the following: the fact that the 
global economic downturn has depressed 
economic activity in the area to a lesser extent 
than it has in advanced economies and some 
other emerging market economies; the fact that 
unemployment tends to be a lagging indicator 16
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in the economic cycle; and the speciﬁ  cs  and 
statistical issues of many Mediterranean 
countries’ labour markets. Israel alone shows 
an increase in unemployment, with a pattern 
similar to that of advanced economies, albeit 
from the lowest base in the region. This reﬂ  ects 
the fact that in 2009 real GDP growth was lower 
in Israel than in other countries in the region. 
The West Bank and Gaza exhibited a decline 
in unemployment as a result of the expected 
development of economic activity, as described 
above, but the level remains exceptionally high 
and differs signiﬁ  cantly between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (18% in the West Bank and 
39% in the Gaza Strip in 2009). 
Notwithstanding the relative stability of 
unemployment  ﬁ   gures in many countries in 
the wake of the global crisis, unemployment 
remains a key economic and social challenge 
in view of demographic developments in most 
Mediterranean countries over the medium and 
long term. An assessment of the labour market 
situation in the region is complicated by two 
factors, which point in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, it would appear that in 
many countries unemployment ﬁ  gures  tend 
to underestimate the employment challenge, 
owing to signiﬁ   cant hidden unemployment 
or underemployment, in particular in the 
agricultural sector and, to a lesser extent, also 
in the public sector. On the other hand, many 
economies have a large informal sector that 
absorbs part of the labour force. Moreover, 
in some Mediterranean countries, labour market 
ﬁ  gures tend to be of low quality, and labour 
market participation rates are generally low by 
international standards.
Taking these caveats into account, a relatively 
simple “back-of-the-envelope” calculation 
shows that the growth rates projected, in the 
wake of the global crisis, for Mediterranean 































1) Projections. West Bank and Gaza data for 2009 are estimated. 
No data are available for Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania and Syria. 
Table 5 Economic growth and employment from a medium-term perspective
Average annual growth (%) Average annual growth (%)















2000-2008  1) 2000-2008  1) 2009-2020 2000-2008  1) 2008 2009-2020 2009-2020 
Egypt 5.0  3.3  1.9  0.7  8.8  2.9  3.5 
Israel 3.8  3.0  1.6  0.8  6.0  2.1  2.4 
Jordan 6.6  3.1  2.1  0.5  13.0  4.5  5.5 
Morocco 4.6  1.3  1.4  0.3  9.6  5.1  6.7 
Syria 4.0  1.3  2.4  0.3  8.4  7.5  8.4 
Tunisia 4.5  1.8  1.5  0.4  14.2  3.8  5.5 
Sources: IMF (real GDP growth, unemployment rate), ILO (employment, labour force projections), Central Bureau of Statistics Syria 
(employment), and ECB staff estimates. 
Notes: 
1) Jordan 2001-2007; Morocco, Syria 2002-2007; Tunisia 2000-2005.17
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countries in 2009-10 would probably not be 
sufﬁ  cient to address the challenge in the area of 
employment if growth were to remain at that 
level for a longer period of time (see Table 5). 
Comparing average real GDP growth over the 
last few years with the growth in employment 
over the same period allows a rough estimate to 
be computed of the implied employment 
elasticity of real GDP growth in the respective 
country. Taking ILO estimates of labour force 
growth for the next decade as a basis, and 
extrapolating the implied employment elasticity 
of the past to the future, rough estimates can 
also be made of the real GDP growth needed to 
stabilise ofﬁ   cial (and already high) 
unemployment rates, as well as the growth 
needed to reduce them by 50%.6
The results indicate that, based on projected 
ﬁ  gures for 2009, real GDP growth rates will in 
most countries barely sufﬁ  ce to even stabilise 
high unemployment over the medium term. 
To signiﬁ  cantly reduce it, considerably higher 
growth rates would be needed. This puts into 
perspective the fact that economic growth in 
Mediterranean countries in the wake of the 
crisis remained positive and higher than in 
advanced economies and many other emerging 
market economies. Unlike some emerging 
market economies, for example those in 
central Europe and the CIS, the Mediterranean 
countries have young populations and need 
to generate employment for a high number 
of new labour market entrants each year. 
Therefore, if the lower growth rates seen in the 
wake of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis were to be 
maintained over a protracted period of time, 
the employment and thus social challenge 
in Mediterranean countries would mount 
signiﬁ  cantly (see also Box 2).
These estimates should be interpreted with caution, as they  6 
rely heavily on the approximate calculation of employment 
elasticities. For some countries, errors in employment 
ﬁ  gures could cause the results to be biased. Moreover, these 
“back-of-the-envelope” calculations assume that the relationship 
between employment and GDP growth will remain constant 
over the next decade, and it will only remain constant if no 
structural changes with regard to the economy or labour market 
conditions occur.
Box 2
LONG-TERM GROWTH PATHS IN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
Compared with other emerging market economies, the Mediterranean region experienced only 
modest economic growth over the last two decades, although its growth performance was 
more benign over the few years preceding the global ﬁ  nancial crisis and subsequent recession. 
For example, while real GDP per capita in central and eastern Europe 1 increased from USD 10,721 
to USD 17,713 (constant 2005 US dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP)) between 
1990 and 2007, per capita income in the Mediterranean region only increased from USD 4,276 
to USD 6,067. Accordingly, the region’s 2007 GDP per capita was equal to only 19% of that of 
the EU-15, compared with 18% in 1990 – in other words, Mediterranean countries barely kept 
up with the EU-15 in terms of income per capita. By contrast, in the same period, the EU-10’s 
GDP per capita increased from an equivalent of 46% to 56% of EU-15 income per capita. 
This box (i) shows that long-term growth patterns among Mediterranean countries differ from 
those in central and eastern Europe, i.e. unlike the situation in the EU-10 countries and contrary 
to what theory would suggest, Mediterranean countries with an initially lower income level do 
not experience faster growth than those with higher levels, and (ii) presents a decomposition 
1  The ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 (EU-10), selected for statistical reasons. They and the Mediterranean countries are 
compared with the 15 countries that were EU members prior to the EU’s enlargement (EU-15) to include countries of central and 
eastern Europe and Cyprus and Malta.18
ECB
Occasional Paper No 118
August 2010
of the differences in output per capita across 
Mediterranean countries, showing the 
differences in inputs and productivity. There 
is strong evidence that low multi-factor 
productivity in Mediterranean countries is the 
main reason why they are struggling to keep 
up with other countries within the region and 
with the EU-15. 
The chart plots the average growth rate of real 
GDP per capita (in PPP terms) for the EU-10 
and the Mediterranean countries between 1990 
and 2007 against the logarithm of the initial 
level of GDP per capita. The EU-10 countries 
show a pattern of growth convergence, i.e. 
poorer countries such as Poland and Estonia 
experienced higher growth rates than initially 
richer countries such as the Czech Republic 
or Slovenia. A linear regression conﬁ  rms 
that growth rates in the EU-10 are negatively 
correlated with the initial wealth level. No 
such relationship can be identiﬁ  ed  among 
Mediterranean countries. In the natural resource-rich countries Algeria, Libya and Mauritania the 
average per capita growth rate was lowest, but their initial income levels differed signiﬁ  cantly. 
There is no clear pattern similar to that in the EU-10 among non-oil exporting countries either. 
In order to better understand why Mediterranean countries do not keep up with European 
GDP-per-capita levels, the table reports the contribution of capital and production technology to 
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x-axis: logarithm of purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP 
per capita in 1990





















Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008) 
and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: The growth rate is calculated as the average annual 
geometric growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted 
constant 2005 USD. Data: 1990-2007; Libya: 1999-2007. 
No data available for West Bank and Gaza.
Growth accounting
(ratios relative to multi-factor productivity in the EU-15)
1990 2007
Contribution from Contribution from
Y/L (K/Y) α/(1-α) A  Y/L  (K/Y) α/(1-α) A 
EU-15  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EU-10  0.46 1.01 0.45 0.56 0.95 0.59 
Mediterranean countries
Average  0.18 1.04 0.17 0.19 1.01 0.19 
Algeria  0.26 1.08 0.24 0.23 1.11 0.21 
Egypt  0.14 1.08 0.13 0.16 0.98 0.16 
Israel  0.75 0.93 0.80 0.78 0.96 0.81 
Jordan  0.14 1.07 0.13 0.15 1.06 0.14 
Lebanon  0.22 0.91 0.25 0.30 0.98 0.31 
Libya  0.43 0.63 0.69 0.42 0.67 0.63 
Mauritania  0.07 0.95 0.07 0.06 1.02 0.06 
Morocco  0.12 1.03 0.11 0.12 1.04 0.12 
Syria  0.12 0.88 0.14 0.13 0.98 0.14 
Tunisia  0.17 1.04 0.16 0.22 0.98 0.23 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008) and ECB staff calculations.
Data: 1990-2007; Cyprus: 1990-1999; Libya: 1999-2002. No data available for West Bank and Gaza.19
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2.3  INFLATION, EXCHANGE RATES 
AND INTEREST RATES
Inﬂ   ation rates, which spiked in 2007 and 
2008, and thus became the Mediterranean’s 
main macroeconomic challenge, have fallen 
signiﬁ  cantly throughout the region in the wake of 
the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil and recession, with 
the decline of global food prices being a major 
factor. In response to the declining inﬂ  ationary 
pressure, most central banks have lowered 
interest rates and/or reserve requirements. 
GDP per capita in 1990 and 2007, relative to the EU-15 level.2 Multiplying both contributions 
yields the relative output-to-labour ratios. The relative contribution of capital to total output in 
the EU-10 and most Mediterranean countries is fairly similar to that in the EU-15. However, 
multi-factor productivity in Mediterranean countries in 2007 reached, on average, the equivalent 
of only 19% of the EU-15 level, compared with 59% in the EU-10. An exception is Israel, which 
exhibits the productivity level closest to that of the EU-15, which largely explains its relatively 
high GDP per capita.
Moreover, multi-factor productivity estimates for 1990 and 2007 indicate that productivity levels 
among the 10 EU Member States that joined in 2004  converges on the productivity levels of 
the EU-15. By contrast, the relative contribution of multi-factor productivity remained fairly 
constant in most Mediterranean countries.  
The reasons for this feeble performance are manifold, and probably include relatively low 
governance levels, weaknesses in institutions and in the business environment, political 
instability (in some cases) and underdeveloped education systems. In order to accommodate the 
needs of their fast-growing populations, to create employment opportunities and to embark on a 
catching-up process similar to that observable in other emerging market economies, economic 
growth will be essential for the prosperity of Mediterranean countries in the long term. Their 
low multi-factor productivity calls for an increased focus on productivity-enhancing policies. 
Governments in the region need to concentrate on implementing further structural reforms 
that will foster competition, improve educational standards and the business environment, and 
strengthen governance.
Looking both at long-term growth and productivity trends and at catch-up patterns of 
Mediterranean countries also puts into perspective their relatively benign performance in the 
wake of the recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis and recession. While their growth rates for 2009 and 
2010 have indeed remained positive and are above those in advanced economies and most other 
emerging market regions, they are low in view of the growth needed to address the employment 
challenge and to embark on a process of catching up (see also the main text). 
2  The methodology developed by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu (2009) is used to calculate measures of relative total factor 
productivity. Given the inputs capital Ki , technology Ai and labour Li , country i’s output Yi is assumed   











= Ai . 
  The factor share of capital in total production is assumed to be α = 1 / 3. The perpetual inventory equation Ki,t+1 = Ii,t (1 – δ) K  i,t is used 
to calculate the capital stock, where Ii,t is the gross ﬁ  xed capital formation in year t. The depreciation rate  is 0.06. The initial capital 
stock is approximated by its steady state value Ki,0 = Ii,0 /(g + δ) with steady state growth rate. While alternative parameterisations may 
yield slightly different quantitative outcomes, the qualitative results presented in this box are robust to alternative approximations of 
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The extent of each response has been determined 
by country-speciﬁ   c circumstances, including 
the level of intensity of the economic slowdown 
and the decline in inﬂ  ationary  pressure, 
considerations concerning capital inﬂ  ows  and 
current account positions, and the exchange 
rate regime. No modiﬁ   cations of exchange 
rate regimes or severe downward pressure on 
currencies have been observed.
INFLATION
Inﬂ  ationary pressure, which had been the main 
macroeconomic challenge in most Mediterranean 
countries in 2007 and 2008, has reduced 
signiﬁ  cantly throughout the region in the wake 
of the global ﬁ   nancial turmoil and recession 
(see Chart 8). This has been the result of lower 
economic activity and the sharp fall in 
commodity prices. In particular, the reduction in 
global food prices, which were the main reason 
for the spike in inﬂ   ation observable in the 
Mediterranean until mid-2008, has alleviated 
inﬂ  ationary pressure in the region, as food has a 
very high weight in the consumption basket of 
most of its countries.7 
Accordingly, in the second half of 2008 
and 2009 inﬂ   ation declined in many 
Mediterranean countries, and the dispersion 
of inﬂ   ation rates was lower than in 2007. 
This fall in inﬂ   ation, which was mainly due 
to declining food prices, eased pressures on 
real incomes in Mediterranean countries, 
an effect which presumably mitigated the impact 
of the global recession on the region’s economy 
by sustaining private consumption. Nevertheless, 
inﬂ  ation rates in some Mediterranean countries 
remain high, limiting the decline of the regional 
average from 8.5% in 2008 to 7.5% in 2009.
Egypt continues to be the country with the 
highest inﬂ   ation rate in the region (with a 
projected average inﬂ  ation rate of 12% in 2010), 
even though price increases have almost halved 
from more than 20% in the second half of 2008 
to 11% in spring 2010 (see Chart 9 on monthly 
inﬂ   ation rates). This is mainly because food 
prices, which have fallen globally, have proven 
to be sticky in Egypt. Food prices – and robust 
domestic demand – are also behind the rising 
inﬂ  ation, against the regional trend, in Algeria, 
which points to monopolistic structures in some 
market segments.
In some countries, inﬂ  ation moved into negative 
territory in the course of 2009. This primarily 
reﬂ   ected statistical base effects, as the price 
index, year on year, was compared against its 
peak in mid-2008 (which also explains the 
particularly sharp fall in inﬂ  ation rates in Jordan, 
where inﬂ  ation also spiked in 2008, owing to the 
phasing-out of oil subsidies). In no country does 
there appear to be any risk of deﬂ  ation.
In most Mediterranean countries, the weight of food items  7 
in the CPI basket amounts to between 36% and 44%. Notable 
exceptions are Israel and Lebanon, where food accounts for less 
than 20% of the national CPI baskets, and Mauritania, where the 
weight of food exceeds 50%. In the euro area, processed and 
non-processed food components make up 19.5% of the basket 
of goods and services included in the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP).
Chart 8 Mediterranean economies: inflation
(percentages)
-2






































Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: 1) Projections. Mediterranean average weighted by GDP 
in PPP terms. Owing to the lack of data comparability, West 
Bank and Gaza are excluded from the average, and 2009 data 
are estimated.21
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In the Mediterranean region, ﬁ   xed pegs or 
tightly managed ﬂ   oats, mainly against the 
US dollar, prevail. Two countries, Libya and 
Syria, peg their currencies to Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs). Morocco and Tunisia are the 
only countries with an orientation of their 
exchange rate policy to the euro. Israel is the 
only country with an independently ﬂ  oating 
currency and a fully ﬂ  edged inﬂ  ation targeting 
framework (see Table 6). Some countries in 
the region, such as Tunisia, seem to pay close 
attention to developments in their real effective 
exchange rate.
Exchange rate developments in the 
Mediterranean region reﬂ   ect the respective 
exchange rate regimes of each country and the 
exchange rate movements of major currencies. 
Unlike in several other emerging market 
economies, particularly in emerging Europe and 
the CIS, no signiﬁ  cant exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations 
triggered by the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil have 
been observable. While foreign exchange 
reserves have declined in some countries, 
downward pressure on national currencies as 
a result of actual or perceived economic and 
ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities has been limited. 
In view of the general depreciation of the 
US dollar against major currencies between 
August 2007 – when the sub-prime crisis 
broke out – and August/September 2008, 
all Mediterranean currencies, with the exception 
of those with a ﬁ  xed peg to the US currency, 
appreciated against the US dollar (see Chart 10). 
This trend was sharply reversed in the aftermath 
of the intensiﬁ   cation of the global ﬁ  nancial 











































West Bank and Gaza
Jan. May Sep. Jan. Jan. May May Sep.
2008 2009 2010
Sources: IMF and Haver Analytics.




Algeria Managed  ﬂ  oat  USD
Egypt Managed ﬂ  oat USD
Israel Independent ﬂ  oat
Jordan Conventional peg USD
Lebanon Conventional peg USD
Libya Conventional peg SDR
Mauritania Managed ﬂ  oat USD
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turmoil in autumn 2008. With the stabilisation 
of global ﬁ  nancial markets in spring 2009, the 
US dollar again started to depreciate against 
major currencies and against those in the 
Mediterranean that were not pegged to the US 
currency. As a result of the US dollar’s rise 
vis-à-vis the euro since late 2009, Mediterranean 
currencies with a euro orientation, i.e. the 
Moroccan dirham and the Tunisian dinar, 
depreciated against the dollar.
Of the Mediterranean countries’ currencies, 
the Israeli shekel has exhibited the strongest 
appreciation against the US dollar, both before 
September 2008 and since spring 2009. This is 
in line with Israel’s exchange rate arrangement 
of a free ﬂ  oat and was triggered by strong capital 
inﬂ  ows, which were partially attributable to a 
repatriation, in the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, of funds held abroad by Israelis, at a 
time when the risk of holding funds in advanced 
economies’  ﬁ   nancial systems was re-assessed 
against the risk of holding funds domestically. 
The Syrian pound appreciated against the 
US dollar in November 2008. While the Syrian 
currency has been pegged to the SDR within a 
horizontal band since 2007, the pound’s moves 
against the US dollar and the euro are more akin 
to those of currencies pegged to the US dollar, 
pointing to tight currency management within 
the band.
Exchange rate ﬂ   uctuations vis-à-vis the 
euro broadly mirror these developments 
(see Chart 11). Fluctuations were very limited 
for the Moroccan dirham (owing to the currency 
basket composition) and also relatively moderate 
for the Tunisian dinar (suggesting that the real 
effective exchange rate plays an important role 
in the country’s exchange rate policy). 
Indeed, the real effective exchange rate of 
Tunisia’s currency is the most stable among 
those Mediterranean countries for which 
comparable data are available (see Chart 12). 
By contrast, Egypt and Israel, and to a lesser 
extent Algeria, experienced an appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate of their currencies 
in 2007 and 2008, which has partially been 
reversed since autumn 2008. In the case of Israel, 
Chart 10 Exchange rates against the US dollar
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Chart 11 Exchange rates against the euro
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the appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate was mainly the result of nominal exchange 
rate movements, while the inﬂ  ation differential 
between Egypt and its major trading partners 
resulting from the spike in inﬂ  ation in the ﬁ  rst 
half of 2008 played a major role in Egypt. 
INTEREST RATES 
In response to declining inﬂ  ationary  pressure 
resulting from the slowdown of economic 
activity and falling commodity prices in the wake 
of global developments, most Mediterranean 
central banks lowered their interest rates 
(see Chart 13). The extent of the reductions 
depended on country-speciﬁ  c  circumstances, 
including the exchange rate regime, the level 
of intensity of the economic slowdown and 
inﬂ   ationary pressure, and considerations 
concerning capital inﬂ  ows and current account 
positions. In addition to lowering interest rates, 
several central banks have also reduced reserve 
requirements in response to the slowdown in 
economic activity, bank lending and changing 
liquidity conditions. This has been a channel 
for easing monetary conditions, in particular in 
countries where the interest rate transmission 
channel is limited and/or where exchange rate 
regimes limit the scope for independent changes 
in interest rates. In general, central banks in the 
region have not been under pressure to resort to 
non-conventional measures to address problems 
Chart 12 Real effective exchange rates
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in the banking sector. This can be attributed to 
the absence of tensions in interbank markets 
(see Sub-section 3.3).
Israel has exhibited the most pronounced 
reduction in interest rates: the Bank of Israel 
lowered its key policy rate by 375 basis points 
from 4.25% in October 2008 to 0.5% in 
April 2009. Consequently, interest rates in Israel 
were the lowest in the region, similar to rates in 
advanced economies. The Israeli central bank 
also launched a programme to purchase 
government bonds and intensiﬁ  ed  foreign 
exchange purchases in order to ease monetary 
conditions.8 It was thus the only central bank in 
the region to adopt “non-conventional” measures 
similar to those taken by central banks in 
advanced economies. In August 2009, the Bank 
of Israel was the ﬁ  rst central bank in the region 
(and, in fact, the world) to again raise interest 
rates in the aftermath of the global crisis. This 
move came after data on economic activity 
suggested that the slowdown might be less 
pronounced than previously expected, and as 
inﬂ   ation – which had not fallen signiﬁ  cantly 
before – again increased above the ceiling of the 
target band (1%-3%), triggering a rise in 
inﬂ  ation expectations. 
The Central Bank of Egypt – after a series 
of interest rate increases to counter rising 
inﬂ   ationary pressure in the ﬁ   rst nine months 
of 2008 – lowered interest rates by 325 basis 
points between February and September 2009, 
from 11.5% to 8.25%. Interest rates in Egypt 
thus remain the highest in the region, reﬂ  ecting 
still relatively high inﬂ  ation rates. Up to a level 
equivalent to the volume of loans extended to 
small and medium-sized enterprises, the central 
bank also exempted banks’ deposits from 
reserve requirements.
In line with the logic of the ﬁ  xed peg to the 
US dollar in an environment of free capital 
movements, the Central Bank of Jordan has 
continued its cautious lowering of interest rates, 
which started as early as September 2007, when 
the Federal Reserve began its monetary easing 
in response to the sub-prime crisis. However, 
it lowered its rates less aggressively, and has 
allowed the interest rate differential between the 
Jordanian dinar and the US dollar to increase, 
taking account of Jordan’s large current account 
deﬁ  cit and the need to generate capital inﬂ  ows 
in a global environment characterised by 
increasing risk aversion.9
In a similar vein, Lebanon, which also pegs 
its currency to the US dollar, has kept interest 
rates stable. This implies a growing interest 
rate differential between the Lebanese pound 
and the US dollar, which reﬂ  ects  Lebanon’s 
underlying vulnerabilities and, in particular, the 
need to attract deposit inﬂ  ows from abroad into 
the banking system in order to ﬁ  nance the large 
twin deﬁ   cit in the ﬁ   scal and current account 
(see also Sub-section 3.2).
Traditionally, some of the countries in the 
Mediterranean region do not resort to interest 
rate moves as a tool to manage macroeconomic 
developments, or only do so at the margins, 
partly owing to limited transmission. Of these 
countries, Morocco and Tunisia lowered 
their interest rates in the ﬁ   rst half of 2009. 
In 2008 and 2009 the Bank of Israel intervened in the foreign  8 
exchange market for the ﬁ   rst time since 1997. There were 
two types of interventions: discretionary interventions and a 
programme of pre-announced purchases of foreign exchange 
reserves. The ﬁ   rst discretionary intervention took place in 
March 2008, and they intensiﬁ  ed in 2009 in the wake of the 
global ﬁ  nancial turmoil. The interventions were aimed at curbing 
disorderly movements in the foreign exchange market and the 
appreciation of the Israeli shekel in view of its strength against 
the US dollar, but also vis-à-vis the euro. Also in March 2008, 
the Bank of Israel announced a programme to increase its foreign 
exchange reserves via daily purchases. In the course of 2008 
and 2009, the daily amounts purchased were increased and the 
programme was extended beyond the initial target for foreign 
exchange reserves. While, at ﬁ  rst, it was explicitly stated that 
the goal of the pre-announced foreign exchange purchases was 
only to increase reserves without inﬂ  uencing the exchange rate, 
the purchases took on multiple purposes after the intensiﬁ  cation 
of global ﬁ   nancial turmoil, when the economy signiﬁ  cantly 
weakened but appreciation pressures persisted. In July 2009, 
the Bank of Israel announced the end of the programme of 
pre-announced foreign exchange purchases, but stated that 
it would continue to intervene on a discretionary basis in the 
event of unusual movements in the exchange rate which are 
inconsistent with underlying economic conditions, or in the event 
of disorderly conditions in the foreign exchange market.
The Central Bank of Jordan also lowered reserve requirements  9 
and stopped the issuance of certiﬁ  cates of deposits – the main 
instrument used to mop up excess liquidity in the banking sector 
– in anticipation of changing liquidity conditions.25
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Bank Al-Maghrib cut its key interest rate by 
25 basis points to 3.25%, after having increased 
it by the same amount in view of inﬂ  ationary 
pressure as recently as in September 2008, 
and the Central Bank of Tunisia reduced its 
key policy rate by 75 basis points to 4.5%. 
Both central banks also reduced their reserve 
requirements.
2.4 FISCAL  DEVELOPMENTS 
Budget balances have weakened in the wake 
of the global recession, most notably in oil-
exporting countries, owing to the sharp drop in 
oil prices. In non-oil-exporting countries ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cits have increased, but not as signiﬁ  cantly 
as in advanced economies, as the economic 
slowdown has been less pronounced, automatic 
stabilisers are relatively weak, and expenditure 
on oil and food subsidies declined after the 
fall in global commodity prices. Some non-
oil-exporting countries have launched ﬁ  scal 
stimulus programmes; however, ﬁ  scal  space 
for counter-cyclical policies is very limited, 
or even absent altogether, in view of the high 
level of public debt in many countries. Only 
oil-exporting countries have room to support 
economic activity, which they have done by 
maintaining public spending at high levels, or by 
increasing it, in spite of the fall in oil revenues. 
BUDGET BALANCES
Fiscal developments in 2009 were characterised 
by a weakening of budget balances throughout 
the region (see Chart 14). The ﬁ  scal deterioration 
was most pronounced in the major oil-exporting 
countries in the region, Algeria and Libya, 
where budget balances weakened by almost 
15% of GDP. Both countries had a high budget 
surplus in 2008, and went from this to a deﬁ  cit 
(Algeria) or to a far lower but still signiﬁ  cant 
surplus (Libya) in 2009. This was the result of 
the sharp fall in oil prices, combined with the 
high dependency of budgets on oil revenues 
(79% and 87% of total budget revenues in 
Algeria and Libya respectively in 2008). Among 
the non-oil-exporting countries, Israel exhibits 
the greatest weakening of the budget balance as 
a result of the crisis. 
While budget deﬁ  cits have been high in several 
countries of the Mediterranean region for 
many years, in particular in Lebanon, Jordan 
and Egypt, their increase in the wake of the 
global recession has been muted in comparison 
with most advanced economies. In addition to 
the fact that the economic slowdown has not 
been as strong in the region as in advanced 
economies (see Sub-section 2.2), this can be 
attributed to the relative weakness of automatic 
stabilisers in many Mediterranean countries. 
They are weaker than those in advanced 
economies on account of  less developed tax 
and social security systems and a smaller 
government sector.10 The only exception is 
Israel, which shares most ﬁ   scal features of 
advanced economies. This explains why the 
country has faced a more pronounced weakening 
of the ﬁ  scal balance.
See Sturm and Gurtner (2007). 10 
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Another factor that has contributed to the 
relatively small increase in budget deﬁ  cits in the 
region is that spending on oil and food subsidies 
has declined as a result of the drop in global 
commodity prices, given that several countries 
have comprehensive subsidy schemes for these 
items in place.
Some countries launched ﬁ  scal  stimulus 
programmes in 2009 to counteract the economic 
slowdown caused by the global recession. 
For example, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and 
Tunisia increased their expenditure on, inter 
alia, infrastructure and/or supported industries 
that were severely affected by the global 
recession. The ﬁ  scal stimulus measures tended 
to be of limited magnitude (approximately 1.5% 
of GDP in Tunisia and Egypt, 1.35% of GDP in 
Israel and 0.5% of GDP in Morocco).11 This was 
because in most cases the ﬁ   scal room for 
manoeuvre to adopt discretionary measures is 
limited or even absent – as holds true of, 
for example, Lebanon – as a result of the high 
debt levels and large deﬁ   cits exhibited even 
before the global recession (see Chart 15). 
Any discretionary ﬁ   scal measures taken to 
sustain domestic demand had to be carefully 
balanced with the need to maintain conﬁ  dence 
and long-term ﬁ  scal sustainability. Accordingly, 
the IMF projected ﬁ   scal tightening and the 
withdrawal of ﬁ   scal stimuli for most non-oil 
exporting countries in 2010.
Only the major oil-exporting countries of 
the region had signiﬁ  cant  ﬁ   scal room for 
manoeuvre, as they had reduced public debt 
and accumulated large reserves in the years of 
high oil prices that preceded the crisis. They 
also exhibited large budget surpluses, which 
masked considerable ﬁ  scal expansion during the 
period in question, when the countries launched 
ambitious programmes to upgrade their physical 
and social infrastructure, and thus signiﬁ  cantly 
increased public capital, but also current 
expenditure.12 Since the sharp fall in oil prices 
that began in mid-2008, these countries have 
also used this ﬁ  scal space to support domestic 
non-oil GDP growth, and have thus, like other 
major oil-exporting countries in the Gulf region, 
also contributed to global stabilisation efforts 
by sustaining import demand. They thereby 
also avoided the pro-cyclical pattern that has 
characterised ﬁ  scal policy in many oil-exporting 
countries in the past. 
For some countries in the region, in particular 
in the eastern Mediterranean, budget outcomes 
depend signiﬁ  cantly on continued donor support 
via direct budgetary support or soft loans. 
Deteriorating  ﬁ   scal positions in key donor 
countries, mainly the United States, the EU 
(and its Member States) and Gulf countries, 
pose a risk for future budgetary support. 
For example, in Jordan, external grants fell 
short of expectations. Thus, in order to stave off 
this risk, the drive for structural ﬁ  scal reforms 
to reduce donor dependency has become more 
urgent in the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
and recession in the countries concerned.
Data obtained from the IMF and national sources. 11 
See Sturm et al. (2009). For instance, Algeria went ahead with  12 
its multi-year public investment programme of USD 155 billion 
(120% of 2007 GDP) and increased public spending further 
in 2009.
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Public debt in most Mediterranean countries has 
risen only moderately, or has remained broadly 
constant, since the crisis; however, it was 
already at high levels in many countries of the 
region, in particular in Lebanon, but also 
in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Mauritania 
(see Chart 16). Lebanon’s extraordinarily high 
level of public debt has declined somewhat, 
mainly as a result of robust economic activity 
(see Sub-section 2.2). Algeria and Libya are the 
only countries in the region for which public 
debt is no longer an issue. In all other countries, 
public debt levels are a severe constraint on 
governments with respect to taking additional 
ﬁ   scal measures in order to support domestic 
demand in the event that economic activity 
remains subdued. As regards the structure of 
public debt in the Mediterranean region, a 
common feature in most countries is the 
predominance of long-term loans with a maturity 
of more than ﬁ   ve years and a relatively low 
dependency on external debt, with the notable 
exception of Lebanon.13
Three of the seven Mediterranean countries 
that have a sovereign rating have been subject 
to rating changes since 2008 (see Table 7). 
Israel received an upgrade by Moody’s and 
Fitch/IBCA in 2008, reﬂ   ecting the steady 
improvement of its ﬁ  scal position prior to the 
intensiﬁ   cation of the global ﬁ  nancial  turmoil. 
A signiﬁ  cant improvement in Morocco’s ﬁ  scal 
position was also the reason for Standard & 
Poor’s decision to upgrade their rating of the 
country from BB+ to BBB- in March 2010. 
Lebanon, after having been downgraded to 
CCC+ by Standard & Poor’s in January 2008, 
was upgraded again to the previous level (B-) 
in August of the same year. Further upgrades to 
See Sturm and Gurtner (2007), Box 3. Based on an analysis  13 
of 2005 data, they ﬁ  nd that the dependency on external debt is 
highest for Jordan, Algeria, Syria and Tunisia, where more than 
50% of the debt is external. For the other countries, external debt 
typically accounts for less than one third of total debt. While in 
most countries long-term loans with a maturity of more than 
ﬁ  ve years predominate, Lebanon is a notable exception to this 
trend. Lebanon’s total domestic debt maturity is equal to (or less 
than) ﬁ  ve years, posing a challenge in terms of funding costs and 
rollover requirements. Moreover, while Lebanon’s debt is mainly 
domestic, it is largely denominated in foreign currency.









































Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: 1) Projections. Mediterranean average weighted by GDP 
in PPP terms. Algeria: central government debt.
Table 7 Sovereign ratings 
S&P Since  Moody's Since  Fitch/IBCA  Since 
Egypt BB+  22 May 2002  Ba1  6 July 2001  BB+  21 Aug. 2002 
Israel A  27 Nov. 2007  A1  17 Apr. 2008  A  11 Feb. 2008 
Jordan BB  3 July 2003  Ba2  21 Aug. 2003  ...  ... 
Lebanon B  22 Dec. 2009  B1  13 Apr. 2010  B  31 Mar. 2010 
Libya A-  18 Mar. 2009  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Morocco BBB-  23 Mar. 2010  Ba1  22 July 1999  BBB-  19 Apr. 2007 
Tunisia BBB  21 Mar. 2000  Baa2  17 Apr. 2003  BBB  24 May 2001 
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: No ratings are avilable for Algeria, Mauritania, Syria and West Bank and Gaza.28
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Lebanon’s rating by all three rating agencies 
followed in the course of 2009 and in early 2010, 
reﬂ   ecting the stabilisation of the country’s 
domestic political situation and its resilience to 
various shocks. However, it currently has the 
lowest rating of the region, owing to its high 
level of public debt and ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit. Libya was 
rated for the ﬁ  rst time by one of the major rating 
agencies in March 2009. It obtained an A- from 
Standard & Poor’s, which is lower than that of 
peers with similarly strong or even weaker ﬁ  scal 
positions. The reasons quoted are the limited 
transparency of ofﬁ  cial decision-making in the 
country, as well as uncertainties surrounding the 
effectiveness of reforms in promoting private 
sector development. 
2.5 EXTERNAL  SECTOR
Large current account surpluses in Mediterranean 
oil-exporting countries have plummeted as a 
result of the sharp drop in oil prices, while most 
non-oil-exporting countries’ current account 
balances have remained broadly stable, or are set 
to strengthen slightly. In most cases, the decline 
in imports due to lower oil prices and weakening 
domestic demand has outweighed the drop in 
exports resulting from sharply falling external 
demand. The large expansion in oil-exporting 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves has come to a 
halt, while changes in non-oil-exporting countries’ 
foreign exchange reserves have varied since the 
intensiﬁ  cation of global ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES
Along with ﬁ   scal positions, current account 
balances are those macroeconomic variables 
that display the most marked differences 
between oil-exporting countries and non-oil-
exporting countries in the Mediterranean region. 
As a result of lower oil prices than in previous 
years, oil-exporting countries’ very large current 
account surpluses, which peaked in 2007 and 
2008, plummeted by around 20%  and 25% of 
GDP (Algeria and Libya respectively) in 2009 
(see Chart 17). This suggests that oil-exporting 
countries’ large current account surpluses of 
previous years were mainly cyclical, i.e. a 
function of high oil prices.
In most non-oil-exporting countries of the region, 
current account balances have remained broadly 
unchanged, or have strengthened slightly. This is 
the result of lower oil prices in combination with 
weaker economic activity. In particular, lower 
oil prices have led to a signiﬁ  cant  reduction 
of the import bill, which has outweighed the 
decline in exports of goods and services in 
many cases and has, accordingly, contributed to 
the strengthening of current account balances. 
This effect is particularly important for Lebanon 
and Jordan, the two countries in the region with 
the highest deﬁ  cit in the oil trade balance over the 
last few years. Nevertheless, the current account 
deﬁ   cits of Lebanon and Jordan, and that of 
Mauritania, remain large. In Israel, the region’s 
only non-oil-exporting country with a current 
account surplus, the weakening of domestic 
demand has been the key driver behind a further 
strengthening of the current account balance, 
as the drop in imports has exceeded the decline 
in exports. Egypt (along with the West Bank 
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and Gaza) is the only exception to this trend 
among the region’s non-oil-exporting countries. 
Egypt’s current account has moved into deﬁ  cit 
after several years of surpluses, as the country’s 
multiple sources of foreign exchange have all 
been affected by the global crisis: oil revenues, 
as well as revenues from non-oil exports, tourism 
and remittances, have declined, in addition to the 
sharp drop in Suez Canal revenues as a result of 
the fall in global trade.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
The development of Mediterranean countries’ 
foreign exchange reserves has also been 
varied. The sharp rise of Algeria and Libya’s 
foreign exchange reserves over the last 
few years – which now account for almost 
two-thirds of all foreign exchange reserves in 
the region – has come to an abrupt halt with the 
sharp drop in oil prices (see Chart 18). While, 
in general, non-oil-exporting countries’ foreign 
exchange reserves were also on the increase in 
previous years (see Chart 19), developments 
since the intensiﬁ  cation of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil have differed from country to country 
(see Chart 20).
Some countries have not seen any signiﬁ  cant 
changes in their foreign exchange reserves. 
Other countries, most notably Israel, Lebanon 
and Jordan, have exhibited an increase in 
reserves since mid-2008. In Israel, this is the 
result of the programme of pre-announced 
purchases of foreign exchange reserves, in 
combination with large discretionary 
interventions to stem the appreciation pressure 
on the Israeli shekel (see Sub-section 2.3). 
In Lebanon, reserves have increased as a result 
of greater conﬁ  dence in the economy in view of 
the political stabilisation and a steady inﬂ  ow 
into bank deposits from abroad. Jordan also 
managed to increase its reserves further, 
implying that the two most vulnerable countries 
in the region have so far weathered the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil relatively well, without 
downward pressure on the exchange rate, as 
they were able to maintain capital inﬂ  ows. 
Morocco and Egypt have seen a drop in foreign 
exchange reserves since mid-2008, reﬂ  ecting 
pressure on the balance of payments. In Egypt, 
the authorities have mainly drawn down foreign 
currency deposits held with commercial banks, 
in view of large portfolio outﬂ  ows in 2008,14 
and have thus limited sharp movements in the 
See Sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3 on the withdrawal of non-residents  14 
from the Egyptian T-bill market and movements in stock 
markets.
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exchange rate. In Morocco, Bank Al-Maghrib 
accommodated a spike in demand for foreign 
currency by the country’s commercial banks in 
the wake of the intensiﬁ  cation of global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
In August 2009, the IMF’s general allocation of 
special drawing rights (SDRs) to member 
countries became effective, which was part of 
the global policy response to the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis – it provided liquidity to the global 
economic system by supplementing member 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves. 
In September 2009, a special SDR allocation 
was made under the IMF’s Fourth Amendment 
to the Articles of Agreement. These SDR 
allocations led to an increase in Mediterranean 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves 
(see Table 8). Reserves rose between 1% and 
5% in most countries. Mauritania’s foreign 
exchange reserves, by contrast, rose by 42% as 
a result of the SDR allocation, reﬂ  ecting  the 
country’s previously very low level of reserves 
(in terms of GDP). Overall, the region’s reserve 
levels have appeared to be adequate enough to 
avert potential shocks and speculative attacks, 
also in comparison with other emerging markets. 
In 2009, reserve levels in most Mediterranean 
countries surpassed the average reserve 
level (relative to GDP) of central, eastern, 
and south-eastern European countries (22.7%), 
as well as the average reserve level of other 
emerging markets (15.9%).15
The level of reserves given for other emerging markets is based on  15 
IMF reporting countries for which data on reserves are available 
and which are neither Mediterranean nor central, eastern and 
south-eastern European emerging market economies.
Chart 20 Changes in foreign exchange 




























Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Note: Latest available data refer to August 2009, except for 
Mauritania (October 2008).







SDR millions  SDR millions  SDR millions  USD millions  Percentage of 
FX reserves
Memorandum item:
(as of September 6, 2009) (August 2009)  FX reserves/GDP
Algeria 930.1  139.4  1069.5  1683.5  1.2  104.5 
Egypt 699.6  63.0  762.5  1200.3  4.0  16.5 
Israel 688.1  88.9  777.0  1223.1  2.2  30.3 
Jordan 126.4  18.8  145.2  228.6  2.2  47.4 
Lebanon 150.5  38.4  188.9  297.4  1.2  85.6 
Libya 833.0  180.9  1013.9  1596.0  1.7  158.9 
Mauritania 47.7 4.2  51.9  81.7  41.7  5.5 
Morocco 436.0  39.7  475.7  748.8  3.4  24.1 
Syria 217.6  25.0  242.6  381.9  …  … 
Tunisia 212.4  26.1  238.5  375.4  3.9  26.5 
Source: IMF.
Note: Data for Mauritania is for October 2008.31
ECB
Occasional Paper No 118
August 2010
3   THE IMPACT 
OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL 




3  THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
TURMOIL AND RECESSION ON BANKING 
SECTORS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
3.1  MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES’ FINANCIAL 
SECTORS – A RECAP OF KEY FEATURES 
AND ISSUES
This sub-section brieﬂ  y recaps the key structural 
features and issues of Mediterranean countries’ 
ﬁ   nancial sectors. Reviewing these features, 
along with standard banking sector indicators, 
provides the background to, and sets the 
stage for, analysing the impact of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil. 
BANK-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Most Mediterranean countries’ ﬁ  nancial sectors 
are bank-based, with capital markets tending 
to be underdeveloped and generally playing 
a subordinate role in ﬁ  nancial  intermediation 
(see Chart 21). Corporate bond markets are 
in a nascent stage of development, with a few 
exceptions such as those in Algeria, Israel 
(see also Sub-section 3.3), Morocco and Tunisia. 
Some Mediterranean countries have miniscule or 
only recently established stock markets, as in the 
case of Algeria, Libya and Syria (the Libyan and 
Syrian stock markets were established in 2008 
and 2009 respectively). In most countries, stock 
market development, as measured against GDP, 
was buoyant until the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
erupted (see also Sub-section 3.3) and, in some 
cases, stock market capitalisation exceeded total 
bank assets prior to the turmoil. This relatively 
recent development should not, however, serve 
to overstate the role of stock markets as a source 
of ﬁ  nance for the corporate sector. The growth of 
stock market capitalisation over the last decade – 
until the point when Mediterranean countries’ 
markets also took a dive in the wake of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil – resulted predominantly from 
price increases, rather than from the issuance 
of new shares or the listing of new companies. 
Accordingly, the role of markets in ﬁ  nancing 
new investment was more limited than stock 
market capitalisation might suggest. Moreover, 
market liquidity tended to be low, with trading 
activity often concentrated on a few stocks.
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES
Mediterranean countries exhibit considerable 
differences as regards the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
deepening and the size of the banking sector. 
In terms of both broad money and bank assets, 
measured against GDP in both cases, Lebanon 
has by far the most developed banking sector 
(see Charts 22 and 23). This is a reﬂ  ection of 
(i) the country’s traditional role as a regional 
ﬁ   nancial centre with relatively sophisticated 
banks that are active in and around Lebanon, 
(ii) the arrival of strong deposit inﬂ  ows from the 
Lebanese diaspora (see also Sub-section 3.2) and 
(iii) the country’s very high level of public debt, 
which is to a large extent funded by domestic 
banks. Other countries with a sizable banking 
sector and a high degree of ﬁ  nancial deepening 
are Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Morocco. The 
banking sectors are small and underdeveloped 
in those oil-exporting countries that also have 
a tradition of heavy state intervention in the 
economy, i.e. Algeria, Libya and Syria. They 
lag behind in terms of economic and ﬁ  nancial 
liberalisation, as many other countries in the 
region have started to implement banking 
sector reforms over the last few years, including 
privatisation and foreign bank entry, and reforms 
of their legislative and regulatory frameworks.
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PRIVATE SECTOR ACCESS TO FINANCING – A KEY 
CHALLENGE
Notwithstanding banking sector reforms, private 
sector access to credit is a challenge in many 
Mediterranean countries and tends to constrain 
investment – this can be gauged by banks’ 
claims on the private sector (see Chart 24). 
Credit to the private sector, measured in terms 
of GDP, is relatively high in Israel and Jordan 
and is at an elevated level in both Lebanon 
(despite claims on the private sector accounting 
for less than one-quarter of total bank assets, 
owing to the high exposure to the public sector) 
and Morocco, which has shown a signiﬁ  cant 
increase in private sector lending in recent 
years. The extent of lending to the private sector 
is particularly small in Algeria, Libya and Syria, 
in line with their generally underdeveloped 
ﬁ  nancial sectors (see above), and in the West 
Bank and Gaza, where it mainly reﬂ  ects a lack 
of bankable projects, given political and thus 
economic uncertainty. Reasons for the low 
level of private sector credit in Mediterranean 
countries include the privileged access of public 
sector companies to credit, an underdeveloped 


































10 West Bank and Gaza
9 Tunisia
11 euro area
Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.










































Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.


























  9  Tunisia
10  West Bank and Gaza





Sources: IMF and ECB staff calculations.33
ECB
Occasional Paper No 118
August 2010
3   THE IMPACT 
OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL 




credit culture and risk management capacity, 
low competitive pressures and a still high stock 
of non-performing loans in some countries. 
Accordingly, for many private sector companies, 
retained earnings are the main source of funding 
for investment, impeding the exploitation 
of business opportunities and ultimately 
economic growth.
LIMITED INTEGRATION INTO GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
Mediterranean countries’ integration into 
global  ﬁ   nancial markets is relatively limited, 
as evidenced, for example, by the low 
amount of foreign bank lending to the region 
(see Chart 25). In the third quarter of 2009, 
the region as a whole accounted for less than 1% 
of the total cross-border claims of BIS-reporting 
banks and only for 3.5% of the cross-border 
claims of BIS-reporting banks on emerging and 
developing countries. Relative to their GDP, 
foreign bank lending is lower than in other 
emerging market regions. The limited ﬁ  nancial 
integration reﬂ  ects the region’s general state of 
economic reform, liberalisation and ﬁ  nancial 
development, set against the background of the 
traditional state domination of the economy in 
many countries. Moreover, while real GDP 
growth in the years prior to the crisis was higher 
than in the previous decade, it did not match the 
growth rates of many other emerging market 
regions, meaning that investment and lending 
opportunities might have been less pronounced 
than in other parts of the world. 
A REVIEW OF STANDARD BANKING SECTOR 
INDICATORS
Standard banking sector indicators for 
Mediterranean countries, based on data from the 
IMF Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) 
of April 2010 and, for some countries, on IMF 
Article IV reports,16 provide a picture of where 
banking sectors stood in the course of 2009. 
Depending on availability, the latest data refer 
to different quarters in 2009, so that the full 
impact of the crisis on banks’ balance sheets 
may not yet be discernible from these 
indicators. 
Standard indicators capturing bank capitalisation, 
bank proﬁ   tability and non-performing loans 
point to generally sound capital positions 
and reasonable proﬁ   tability in the region. 
Asset quality is revealed as being the Achilles 
While using IMF (2010b) GFSR data ensures that data are  16 
broadly comparable across countries, the drawback is that they 
are only available for six countries for the years preceding 2009. 
Data for Algeria, Libya and Syria are taken from the latest IMF 
Article IV reports published in the second half of 2009, or the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2010, i.e. they may not be fully comparable.
Chart 25 Total bilateral claims of BIS reporting banks by region
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heel of some countries’ banking sectors, 
as non-performing loan (NPL) ratios are still 
very high, notwithstanding some progress in 
dealing with NPLs and increasing provisions 
over the last few years. Accordingly, some 
countries, notably Algeria, Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, entered the global ﬁ  nancial crisis with 
an already high stock of problematic assets on 
their banks’ balance sheets.
Mediterranean countries’ banks are, in general, 
sufﬁ  ciently capitalised, with a capital adequacy 
ratio of more than 10% (see Chart 26). Jordanian 
banks have the highest level of capitalisation, 
as also indicated by the ratio of bank capital 
to unweighted assets, which gauges the overall 
leverage of banking sectors. 
Bank proﬁ   tability in Mediterranean countries 
can generally be assessed as satisfactory, despite 
signiﬁ   cant differences between countries and 
the fact that proﬁ  tability is higher in many other 
emerging market economies (see Chart 27). 
An increase in proﬁ   tability is obstructed, in 
several countries, by a narrow product range 
with a focus on traditional lending and a high 
number of non-performing loans. 
Several Mediterranean countries’ banking sectors 
entered the global ﬁ   nancial turmoil with an 
already high stock of non-performing loans, and 
in some cases also with relatively low levels of 
provisioning (see Chart 28). Progress has been 
made in reducing NPLs and increasing provisions 
over the last few years: for example, the NPL ratio 
in Jordan declined from 17% in 2002 to less than 
5% in 2008. Nevertheless, NPL levels remain 
high, in particular in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, where NPLs account for 15% or more of 
total loans. While provisions in Egypt have now 
reached 90% of total NPLs, they account for less 
than 60% in Tunisia and less than 20% in Syria. 
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3.2  THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 
ON BANKING SECTORS
This sub-section identiﬁ   es a number 
of areas in which the effects of global 
ﬁ  nancial developments on banking systems in 
Mediterranean countries are discernible (based 
on data available so far), and examines issues that 
are relevant to advanced and/or other emerging 
market economies, but do not necessarily 
constitute risks to, or have the same relevance 
in, the Mediterranean region. First, an analysis 
of the exposure to “toxic” assets originating in 
the United States and the interconnectedness 
between Mediterranean countries and foreign 
banks and international credit ﬂ  ows is presented. 
This is followed by an examination of the 
liability side of banks’ balance sheets, namely 
deposit growth and deposit dollarisation in the 
wake of the crisis, as well as by a close look 
at the asset side, i.e. trends in credit growth, 
asset quality and the extension of credit to the 
private sector in comparison with that extended 
to the public sector. Finally, a topic relevant to 
the Mediterranean region is discussed, namely 
the impact of the crisis on privatisation in the 
banking sector.
EXPOSURE TO “TOXIC” ASSETS
The epicentre of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil that 
started in August 2007 was the US sub-prime 
mortgage market. The ﬁ  rst transmission channel 
of the crisis to ﬁ   nancial sectors outside the 
United States was via securitised US mortgages 
of various types, which were purchased by banks 
around the globe, notably in an environment of 
low interest rates that was conducive to a “search 
for yield”. These US asset-backed securities – 
often highly complex – turned “toxic” as default 
rates on housing loans in the United States 
increased and the underlying assets lost value.
The exposure of ﬁ   nancial institutions in 
Mediterranean countries to long-term US 
asset-backed securities was only minor, and this 
can be used as a proxy to gauge to what extent 
mortgage-related securities found their way into 
banks’ assets in the different countries of the 
region (see Table 9). In all countries, with the 
exception of Israel, exposure was either 
non-existent or negligible, indicating that the 
bulk of these assets were purchased by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in advanced economies, and not by 
those in emerging market and developing 
economies. The following factors explain this 
lack of exposure of Mediterranean banks: 
(i) the risk aversion of banks in the region; 
(ii) a lack of sophistication that has prevented 
the banks from investing in complex 
products; and (iii) tight regulation.17 In Israel, 
only one large bank had signiﬁ  cant exposures to 
US asset-backed assets, resulting in losses 
equal to 25% of capital. This was not, 
however, “life-threatening”. Moreover, most US 
asset-backed securities held by Israeli banks 
comprised senior debt of government-sponsored 
enterprises (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae).
RELIANCE ON FOREIGN BANKS 
AND CROSS-BORDER CREDIT FLOWS
Another channel through which Mediterranean 
countries’ banks could have been affected by 
the crisis is their reliance on foreign banks 
For instance, the Central Bank of Lebanon had banned investment  17 
in mortgage-backed securities in 2005.





Egypt 76  75 
Israel 1,432  1,725 
Jordan 1  <  0.5 
Lebanon 2  3 
Mauritania 0  0 
Morocco  < 0.5  < 0.5 
Syria 0  0 
Tunisia 54  1 
West Bank and Gaza  0  0 
Algeria, Libya, Gabon, Nigeria  1) 3  6 
Memorandum 
Total Africa  404  304 
Total Asia  454,017  676,088 
Total Caribbean  295,690  295,318 
Total Europe  670,408  515,494 
Total Latin America  6,538  7,005 
Source: US Treasury International Capital System (TICS).
Note: as of 30 June of the respective year.
1) The US TICS groups these countries together.37
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and the reduction of cross-border credit 
ﬂ   ows that resulted from the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil. The effects emanating from this 
transmission channel, however, appear to have 
been limited so far. This is probably a result 
of the relatively low degree of integration 
into international ﬁ   nancial markets of most 
countries in the region, also in terms of foreign 
ownership of banks.  
The overall reliance of Mediterranean countries 
on banks from the EU and the United States – 
which have been severely affected by the crisis 
and where the process of deleveraging has been 
intense – is low (see Chart 29). While US banks 
are hardly active in the region, European banks 
have a greater presence, with signiﬁ  cant claims 
on Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, in particular. 
However, in comparison with south-eastern 
Europe, for example, Mediterranean countries’ 
dependence on bank ﬁ  nancing from the EU is 
much more limited. The risk that deleveraging 
and heightened risk aversion in advanced 
economies in the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis will lead to ﬁ  nancial disruption, e.g. via 
the cutting of banks’ credit lines, has thus been 
less relevant to Mediterranean economies than 
to countries in emerging Europe.
Mediterranean banks also have relatively low 
foreign liabilities, except in the case of Lebanon 
and Jordan, and – to some extent – Israel and 
Tunisia (see Chart 30). A signiﬁ  cant share of 
Chart 29 Claims of EU and US banks 
on Mediterranean economies
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Chart 30 Foreign liabilities of Mediterranean banks
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Lebanese banks’ foreign liabilities are deposits 
held by the Lebanese diaspora, which have been 
a relatively stable source of funding, and those 
of Jordanian banks are to a large extent regional, 
thus tending to be relatively stable. Nevertheless, 
maintaining conﬁ  dence in the banking system 
and the overall macroeconomic environment is 
particularly important in these countries. 
The role of foreign banks in Mediterranean 
countries is also limited (see Table 10), 
although some progress has been made as a 
result of privatisation over the last few years 
(this is not yet fully reﬂ  ected in the table). While 
the number of foreign banks active in some 
countries is sizable, the share of assets owned 
by them is generally low. This contrasts sharply 
with the situation in many central, eastern and 
south-eastern European countries.
The relatively low degree of international 
ﬁ   nancial integration of Mediterranean banks, 
as reﬂ   ected in limited funding from foreign 
sources, is also mirrored in generally low 
loan-to-deposit ratios (see Chart 31). 
Loan-to-deposit ratios have consistently 
remained below 100% in all the region’s 
countries. Accordingly, banks rely mainly on 
domestic sources to fund lending. The relatively 
low loan-to-deposit ratios may reﬂ  ect (i) limited 
bank lending on account of, for example, 
underdeveloped banking sectors (as in the 
case of Libya) or a lack of bankable projects 
(as in the case of the West Bank and Gaza), 
and (ii) a stable inﬂ   ow into the domestic 
banking system from savings (in Lebanon, 
for instance). Low loan-to-deposit ratios tend 
to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, 
for example, that global deleveraging translates 
into a disruption of ﬁ  nancial intermediation in 
Mediterranean countries.
A key development in the wake of the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis has been the sharp reduction of 
cross-border lending by BIS-reporting banks. 
This began in the second quarter of 2008 and 
became more pronounced after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. While total cross-border 
claims of BIS-reporting banks fell by an average 
compound quarterly growth rate of 1.8% over 
the period from the third quarter of 2008 to 
the third quarter of 2009, total credit ﬂ  ows 
Table 10 Bank ownership structure
(2005)
Algeria Egypt Israel  Jordan  Lebanon  Morocco 
Number of commercial banks: 18  43  15  23  64  16 
of  which  government-owned  7  15 0 0 0 5 
of  which  foreign-owned  10  20 1 8  25 5 
Fraction of assets owned by foreign banks (%)  9.0  20.9  n/a  9.5  n/a  21.9 
Source: World Bank, Database on Bank Regulation and Supervision (June 2008).
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to Mediterranean countries exhibited slightly 
positive growth with an increase of 0.2% 
(see Chart 32). Notwithstanding this relatively 
benign average ﬁ   gure, there have been some 
noticeable reductions in certain countries, in 
particular in Lebanon, Libya, and Mauritania. 
As regards claims of EU banks on 
Mediterranean countries, only a marginal 
reduction was recorded over the course of 2009 
(as a percentage of Mediterranean countries’ 
GDP), except in the case of Egypt, Jordan, and 
Lebanon (see Chart 33). This contrasts with 
developments in some south-eastern European 
countries, where exposure has been reduced 
more signiﬁ  cantly – however, the initial claim 
levels were much higher. 
Most funding of Mediterranean countries 
by BIS-reporting banks originates in the EU 
(see Chart 34), although the overall amount of 
Chart 32 Changes in cross-border claims 
on Mediterranean countries in the period from the 
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Sources: BIS (Consolidated Banking Statistics), IMF and ECB 
staff calculations.
Notes: Banks’ claims as of the fourth quarter of 2008 and 2009, 
and GDP data for 2008 and 2009. WBG stands for West Bank 
and Gaza, and FYROM for FYR Macedonia.
Chart 34 EU banks’ shares in total foreign 
claims on Mediterranean countries
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total claims in terms of GDP differs signiﬁ  cantly 
from country to country. With the exception of 
Israel, EU banks account for more than 70% 
of total foreign claims in all Mediterranean 
countries. Among EU banks, French banks 
provide the highest share of funding for most 
Mediterranean countries.
DEPOSIT GROWTH AND DOLLARISATION 
Mediterranean countries’ banking sectors have 
exhibited a sound development of their deposit 
base in the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
(see Chart 35). This can be seen as a sign of 
conﬁ  dence in the banking sectors, and is crucial, 
as domestic deposits are the main source of 
funding for the region’s banks (see above). 
In some countries, the growth rate of bank 
deposits slowed down in the course of 2008 
and 2009 in comparison with previous years. 
Some countries also appeared to have beneﬁ  ted 
from the crisis in terms of inﬂ  ows from abroad – 
Israel and Lebanon, for example – as the 
perception of the risks in their banking systems 
relative to those in some advanced economies 
changed as a result of the crisis. 
Another indicator of continued conﬁ  dence  is 
the decline in deposit dollarisation in countries 
that traditionally have a relatively high share of 
foreign currency deposits. In the Mediterranean 
region, this is the case for Lebanon and, to a 
lesser extent, Jordan, as a result of past economic 
shocks and crises. In both countries the share of 
US dollar deposits has continued to decrease, 
to the beneﬁ  t of local currency deposits, since 
the intensiﬁ  cation of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
in September 2008 (see Chart 36). This is an 
indication that depositors do not perceive any 
increased risk of a devaluation vis-à-vis the 
US dollar, to which local currencies are pegged 
(see Sub-section 2.3).
Rather than being driven by global 
developments, deposit dollarisation in Lebanon 
is strongly inﬂ  uenced by domestic political and 
geopolitical events, as evidenced by the spike 
in dollarisation following the assassination 
of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, and that 
following the armed conﬂ  ict in 2006 and the 
ensuing domestic political stalemate. A decline 
in dollarisation was exhibited in the wake of the 
Chart 35 Bank deposit growth
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Chart 36 Foreign currency deposits 
in Lebanon and Jordan
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stabilisation of the domestic political situation 
in 2008 and 2009. Given Lebanon’s high 
exposure to domestic political and geopolitical 
risks, these appear to be more important 
determinants of conﬁ  dence in the currency and 
the domestic banking sector than global ﬁ  nancial 
developments. Nevertheless, the persistently 
high degree of deposit dollarisation is a sign 
of vulnerability. Moreover, the recent increase 
in the share of local currency deposits is also 
related to a growing interest rate differential in 
favour of deposits denominated in Lebanese 
pound, generated by the Central Bank of 
Lebanon in order to promote the use of the local 
currency (see Chart 37).
CREDIT GROWTH AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS
Most Mediterranean countries have experienced 
relatively high rates of growth in credit to the 
private sector over the last few years, although 
this growth was generally not as buoyant as that 
in central, eastern and south-eastern European 
countries (see Chart 38). Credit growth in the 
region continued unabated after the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil erupted in August 2007. 
However, since the intensiﬁ  cation of the turmoil 
in autumn 2008, a slowdown has  been observed 
in several countries, for example in Egypt, Israel 
and Jordan, while the pace of credit extension 
in other countries appears to have remained 
unchanged (see Chart 39).
Chart 37 Interest rate differential 
and de-dollarisation in Lebanon
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Chart 39 Claims on the private sector 
in the wake of the global financial turmoil
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The slowdown in credit growth recorded since 
late 2008 is a reﬂ  ection of the global economic 
downturn, which has since then also spilled 
over to emerging market economies, including 
those in the Mediterranean region. Demand 
for credit has probably decreased in view of 
dampened economic prospects, and there are 
currently no signs of a credit crunch that is 
driven by the supply side (in addition to the 
general problems of the private sector in many 
countries of the region in obtaining credit – 
see Sub-section 3.1). 
Unlike the situation in central and south-
eastern Europe, foreign currency credit to the 
private sector is not a major ﬁ  nancial stability 
concern in the Mediterranean region. Lebanon 
is the only country with a very high share of 
credit extended in foreign currency (mainly in 
US dollars), which has declined somewhat 
since autumn last year (see Chart 40). To avoid 
a currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets, 
Lebanon limits the ratio of private sector loans to 
deposits in foreign currencies to 70% (see above 
on deposit dollarisation in Lebanon). Some 
other countries, such as Egypt, Israel and Jordan, 
also have a non-negligible, albeit moderate, 
level of foreign currency credit.
Looking at individual ﬁ  nancial  institutions, 
banks in the region appear to be in the “comfort 
zone” as regards a combination of NPL ratios 
and capitalisation, in comparison with cases of 
past bank defaults in the Mediterranean countries 
(see Chart 41).18 
Looking ahead, the prospects for asset quality 
could potentially be an issue of concern in 
Mediterranean banking sectors in the wake 
of the global ﬁ   nancial turmoil and recession, 
given (i) that many banks in the region entered 
the economic downturn with an already high 
stock of non-performing loans (see Section 3.1, 
Chart 28) and (ii) that the strong credit growth of 
previous years has contributed to the decline in 
NPL ratios (as have speciﬁ  c policies addressing 
the issue) and that the quality of this newly 
generated credit portfolio still needs to be tested 
in a more challenging economic environment. 
It should be noted, however, that this chart only covers those  18 
banks that reported non-performing loans.
Chart 40 Foreign currency-denominated 
credit to the private sector
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Sources: Haver Analytics, Central Bureau of Statistics Israel, 
Central Bank of Jordan and ECB staff calculations.
Chart 41 Non-performing loans 









y-axis: NPLs as a percentage of total assets
0 5 1 01 52 02 5
















NPL threshold Bank Al-Madina, 2001
Industrial Development Bank of Israel, 2001
Sources: Bankscope and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Only for banks reporting non-performing loans (NPLs). 
The thresholds for NPLs and the capital adequacy ratios (CARs) 
are derived from past experience and reﬂ  ect the minimum NPL 
and CAR levels of past defaulting banks (Bank Al-Madina 
(Lebanon) and Industrial Development Bank of Israel) one year 
before their insolvency.43
ECB
Occasional Paper No 118
August 2010
3   THE IMPACT 
OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL 




While an increase in defaults, and thus in 
non-performing loans, is normal in an economic 
downturn, the combination of an entrenched 
problem in several countries’ banking sectors 
with the potentially detrimental nature of the 
global economic cycle is a speciﬁ  c risk for the 
region. In the Mediterranean region, an increase 
in NPL ratios as a result of the crisis would be 
added to an already high share of low-quality 
assets in some countries and would thus further 
impair banks’ balance sheets. At the same time, 
the economic slowdown may be protracted and 
not be followed by a dynamic recovery. In this 
case, apart from an increase in NPLs, the outlook 
for growth in banks’ core earnings would also be 
dampened by weak prospects for lending activity.
The exposure of some banks in the 
Mediterranean to speciﬁ  c sectors, for example 
the property sector, construction and tourism, 
which boomed in the years prior to the crisis but 
suffered in its aftermath, might need particular 
attention. Property market developments 
are particularly important for Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Morocco, which have experienced 
a rapid expansion of credit to this sector over the 
last few years. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
property sales in these countries have dropped 
since the beginning of 2009. In particular, 
demand for secondary homes in popular tourist 
spots has moderated considerably in Egypt and 
Morocco. Prudential regulation has prevented 
an excessive exposure of individual banks to the 
property sector in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The Moroccan authorities are strengthening their 
surveillance practices with regard to, inter alia, 
mortgages and the property sector, particularly 
as a result of the contraction in demand 
for high-end property (which often comes 
from Europe).
To what extent banks’ asset quality is a matter of 
concern depends not only on NPL ratios, but also 
on whether governments are in a ﬁ  scal position 
to step in and support the banking system. 
Mediterranean countries differ signiﬁ  cantly 
in terms of their ﬁ   scal room for manoeuvre. 
Among the four countries with the highest NPL 
ratios – Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – 
two countries, Algeria and Libya, have ample 
ﬁ  scal space (see Sub-section 2.4). Furthermore, 
in these two countries, most NPLs are owed by 
state companies to public banks. To resolve the 
issue of NPLs, the governments can therefore 
either inject capital into state companies to 
enable them to repay loans, or support the state 
banks. Thus, the issue ultimately boils down 
to the solvency of the government, which, 
owing to buoyant oil revenues of previous 
years, low public debt and large reserves, 
is not in jeopardy in either of the two countries. 
By contrast, Egypt and Tunisia have only limited 
ﬁ  scal room for manoeuvre.
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC SECTOR CREDIT
Since autumn 2008, there has been a clear trend 
in most Mediterranean countries (and beyond) 
towards a slowdown in bank lending to the 
private sector (see above), and an increase in 
credit extended to the public sector. This is 
reﬂ   ected in the ratio of outstanding credit to 
the private sector to credit to the public sector, 
which has recently been either declining slightly 
or stagnating in most countries where it had 
been rising before (see Chart 42). The growth 
Chart 42 Credit to the private sector versus 
credit to the public sector
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in bank credit to the public sector has been 
most pronounced in Israel, Egypt and Jordan, 
whereas the phenomenon is non-existent in 
oil-exporting countries of the region, as they can 
draw on assets accumulated over previous years 
to ﬁ  nance budget deﬁ  cits (see Chart 43).
This trend has been driven by the following 
developments:
Fiscal deﬁ  cits have increased as a result of    •
the economic downturn, so that the ﬁ  nancing 
requirements of the public sector have been 
on the rise.
Foreign investors have largely withdrawn    •
from local Treasury bill markets in the wake 
of the intensiﬁ  cation of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil. Accordingly, in countries where 
such markets are relevant, governments have 
had to rely increasingly on domestic banks 
to absorb T-bills issued to ﬁ  nance  rising 
deﬁ  cits. A case in point has been Egypt where 
increased issuance has driven up the share 
of government securities in total domestic 
credit, from around 46% in mid-2008 
to 57% in early-2010 (see Chart 44). At the 
same time, the share of outstanding T-bills 
held by non-residents, as well as the share of 
foreign currency-denominated government 
securities, has decreased.
The economic slowdown has reduced    •
demand for credit from the private sector in 
view of dampened economic prospects and 
lower capacity utilisation, which has led to a 
reconsideration of investment plans.
For banks, the opportunity to increase lending 
to the public sector may not be unwelcome. 
As lending to the government is usually 
less risky than lending to the private sector 
(as long as public ﬁ   nances are sufﬁ  ciently 
sound), it improves their risk proﬁ  le, in particular 
as lending to the private sector involves more 
risks related to the economic slowdown and 
as some already hold a relatively high stock of 
non-performing loans.
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For the economy as a whole, however, this 
development may become problematic if the 
additional resources channelled to the public 
sector are anything other than resources freed 
as a result of lower private sector demand for 
funding. In other words, if the decrease in 
private sector credit is anything other than 
demand-driven, re-directing credit to the public 
sector in view of higher ﬁ  nancing requirements 
and foreign investor withdrawal constitutes a 
case of crowding-out, with potentially adverse 
effects on private investment and economic 
growth. This would take place against the 
background of long-standing difﬁ  culties  with 
private sector access to credit in several countries, 
and would thus exacerbate this problem 
(see Sub-section 3.1).
In the case of emerging market economies, 
the potential for crowding-out has two 
dimensions: (i) in view of rising budget deﬁ  cits, 
the public sector increasingly relies on domestic 
bank  ﬁ   nancing, i.e. private credit is crowded 
out by public credit (domestic dimension); 
and (ii) increased public ﬁ  nancing requirements 
in advanced economies, given sharply rising 
budget deﬁ  cits in combination with the increased 
risk aversion of foreign investors in the wake of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis, may lead to a crowding-out 
of credit to some emerging market economies 
by credit to advanced economies (external 
dimension). 
PRIVATISATION
The global ﬁ   nancial turmoil appears to have 
slowed down the process of bank privatisation in 
some Mediterranean countries, which had gained 
momentum in previous years (see Table 11). 
This holds true of Algeria and Egypt. In Algeria, 
the sale of the country’s third largest bank, 
Credit Populaire d’Algérie  (CPA), has been 
postponed  indeﬁ   nitely by the government, 
which initially intended to sell 51%. The sale 
was ofﬁ  cially launched in October 2006, and had 
reached its ﬁ  nal stage, but was cancelled in late 
November 2007. In Egypt, the privatisation of 
the third largest public bank, Banque du Caire, 
was postponed in June 2008. By contrast, bank 
privatisation has continued in Libya where two 
banks were partially privatised in 2007 and 2008 
and where tenders for two banking licences to 
establish subsidiaries have been announced by 
the Libyan central bank, and in Tunisia where 
Banque Tuniso-Koweitienne was privatised 
in 2008.
There are three potential causes behind the 
adverse impact of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
on bank privatisation in Mediterranean countries 
(and possibly beyond): 
As potential bidders have come under    •
stress owing to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
they may lose their appetite (or ability) 
for foreign acquisitions. For example, 
Citigroup, which was one of the six 
ﬁ   nalists (together with ﬁ   ve EU banks) 
in the bid for Algeria’s Credit Populaire 
d’Algérie, withdrew from the process as 
a consequence of the sub-prime crisis. 
For Egypt’s Banque du Caire, bidders failed 
to meet the government’s target price, which 
may also be related to the impact of ﬁ  nancial 
stress on bidding banks.
For governments in the process of bank    •
privatisation, the global ﬁ  nancial  turmoil 
may have increased the uncertainty 
about the soundness of bidding banks, 
Table 11 Privatisation of banks 
in Mediterranean countries




Egypt 2004  1  52 
Egypt 2005  2  65 
Egypt 2006  5  4,117 
Egypt 2007  2  170 
Lebanon 2005  1  236 
Libya 2007  1  205 
Libya 2008  1  308 
Morocco 2004  1  86 
Tunisia 2005  1  42 
Tunisia 2008  1  340 
Sources: World Bank, Privatization Database and ECB staff 
calculations.46
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in particular those from advanced economies. 
The  ﬁ  nancial position of potential bidders 
may be opaque, making it more difﬁ  cult 
for governments to assess their ability to 
successfully run privatised banks and to 
contribute to the overall development of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. This factor seems also to 
have played a role in the Algerian case.
The global ﬁ   nancial turmoil, along with    •
developments in advanced economies’ 
banking sectors, may have increased political 
opposition in emerging market economies to 
bank privatisation in general, and to foreign 
ownership in particular. Nationalisations 
and other problems experienced by banks 
in the United States and the EU, as well as 
issues associated with a strong foreign bank 
presence in central, eastern and south-eastern 
Europe, could lead to a backlash against bank 
privatisation, foreign bank entry and ﬁ  nancial 
liberalisation in general, making it harder for 
reform-oriented forces to argue their case. 
BANKING SECTOR POLICIES IN RESPONSE 
TO THE CRISIS
Given the thus far limited overall impact of 
global ﬁ  nancial and economic developments on 
ﬁ  nancial sectors of Mediterranean countries, the 
policy response has also been muted, in particular 
in comparison with the measures taken by 
advanced economies. In many advanced 
economies, far-reaching and comprehensive 
steps had to be taken by governments and central 
banks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
in order to stabilise the ﬁ  nancial  system. 
Government measures there focused on 
guaranteeing deposits and interbank lending, 
on capital injections into banks and on relief 
programmes for impaired assets, while central 
banks resorted to non-conventional measures to 
ensure sufﬁ  cient liquidity provision.19 
In Mediterranean countries, ﬁ  nancial  sector 
policies in response to the crisis have been 
mainly precautionary in character. There 
has been no need to recapitalise banks or 
to address impaired assets (apart from the 
long-standing NPL problem in some countries). 
The precautionary measures that have 
been taken are manifold. They include, for 
example, (the announcement or reiteration of) 
deposit guarantees (Egypt, Israel, Jordan), 
the requirement to retain dividends instead 
of distributing them in order to strengthen the 
capital base of banks (Jordan), an increase in the 
capital adequacy ratio (Morocco) and increased 
provisioning for NPLs (Tunisia). Several 
countries have enhanced the monitoring of 
banks’ exposure to sectors potentially affected 
most by the crisis, such as the property sector, 
construction, tourism and exports. Moreover, 
some countries are considering a strengthening 
of their banking supervisory structures.20
3.3  THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 
ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
This sub-section tracks the impact of the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil on different segments of 
Mediterranean countries’ ﬁ  nancial  markets, 
looking at stock markets, corporate bond 
markets, sovereign bond and credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads and interbank markets. Stock 
markets have been the most severely affected by 
global developments, while other markets have 
been affected only at the margins, partly owing 
to the extent of their development in many 
countries of the region.  
In the euro area, government support of the banking sector  19 
is estimated to have led to a direct increase in public debt of 
3.3% of (2009) euro area GDP. Contingent liabilities as a 
result of guarantees already provided amount to 7.5% of GDP, 
which may rise to up to 19.9% of GDP if banks take recourse 
to all the support measures offered thus far. See ECB (2009a). 
See ECB (2009b) on the ECB’s response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis as 
regards the implementation of monetary policy and non-standard 
measures, and ECB (2009c) on recent developments in the 
balance sheets of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System 
and the Bank of Japan.
For example, in July 2009 Egypt merged the separate agencies in  20 
charge of securities markets and insurance into one supervisory 
body, the General Authority for Financial Supervision. In the 
West Bank and Gaza, oversight of the securities markets was 
transferred from the Palestine Monetary Authority to a newly 
established Capital Market Authority. In Israel, a reform is under 
discussion that will adjust supervisory structures in line with 
the changes that have taken place in the ﬁ  nancial sector in the 
wake of the banking sector and capital market reforms of the last 
few years, which led to an increased role of non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, in particular insurance companies and mutual and 
provident funds.47
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Stock markets were the area in which the impact 
of intensiﬁ  ed global ﬁ  nancial turmoil was felt 
most directly and most immediately in the 
Mediterranean region. Mediterranean countries’ 
stock markets recorded signiﬁ  cant losses in the 
second half of 2008 (see Chart 45). The losses 
of 2008 followed several years of very strong 
stock market growth fuelled by buoyant global 
stock market developments and a speciﬁ  c 
regional feature – the regional recycling of oil 
revenues from GCC countries in the wake of 
high oil prices, which drove up stock markets in 
Egypt and Jordan, for example, as well as, albeit 
to a lesser extent, in Morocco.
This pattern of regional oil revenue recycling 
also explains why in the ﬁ  rst phase of global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil, between August 2007 and 
mid-2008, most Mediterranean stock markets 
enjoyed a brief period of decoupling from 
global stock markets, including the MSCI for 
emerging markets. While the MSCI already 
saw a moderate correction as a result of 
the global re-pricing of risks in this period, 
stock market indices in Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco, for example, continued to rise. 
This short period of decoupling came to an end in 
mid-2008 when oil prices rapidly fell from the 
peak they had reached in July, and in particular 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September. The global rise in risk aversion 
triggered a sharp fall in most Mediterranean 
stock markets, and GCC stock markets also 
recorded dramatic losses, exacerbated by the 
abrupt change in economic outlook resulting 
from the sharp fall in oil prices – i.e. the 
speciﬁ  c regional factor of oil revenue recycling 
lost force. Since March 2009, Mediterranean 
countries’ stock markets have seen a recovery 
largely in line with global and emerging 
market developments. However, the overall 
impact of stock market developments on the 
real economy in the Mediterranean should not 
be overestimated, as stock markets are only 
playing a limited role in ﬁ  nancing investment 
in most countries of the region.
A few country-speciﬁ  c developments are worth 
noting. Israel’s stock market has been that which 
has followed the MSCI EM index most closely, 
indicating that portfolio investment tends to be 
driven by global developments (see also Box 3). 
This reﬂ   ects the country’s high degree of 
Chart 45 Stock market developments
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international ﬁ  nancial integration, with regional 
trends not playing a role. The Lebanese market, 
by contrast, is very much driven by domestic 
political and geopolitical events (see also 
Sub-section 3.2 on trends in dollarisation), 
which explains the sharp rise in May 2008 
against the global market trend (in response to 
the reduction of domestic political tension) and 
the spike in June 2009 (following the parliament 
elections). Developments in the West Bank and 
Gaza also tend to be driven by political events, 
rather than by global economic trends. Egypt’s 
market experienced relatively large upward and 
downward movements before and after the crisis, 
while the strongest recovery since the crisis has 
been that of the Tunisian stock market.
Box 3
INTEGRATION OF MEDITERRANEAN STOCK MARKETS
Based on a cointegration analysis applied to stock market indices, this box evaluates the extent 
of integration between ﬁ  nancial markets in Mediterranean countries and the United States, the 
EU, the GCC, and emerging market stock indices. Cointegration methods have been widely used 
to study the integration of ﬁ  nancial markets in both advanced economies (Taylor and Tonks 
(1989) and Kasa (1992)) and emerging markets, particularly in central and eastern Europe 
(Gilmore and McManus (2002), and Syrioupoulus (2006)). This box presents the results of tests 
(i) for co-movement among bilateral pairings of two stock indices based on the Engle-Granger 
procedure and (ii) whether an individual stock index can be dropped from a co-integrating vector 
of Mediterranean stock markets without affecting the overall cointegration relationship, based on 
an exclusion restriction test within the Johansen framework.
End-of-period stock market indices have been taken from Bloomberg for the period from the 
ﬁ  rst week of 2000 to the fortieth week of 2009 (505 observations). Weekly indices reduce the 
problem of non-synchronous trading in Mediterranean markets and suffer less from heavy-tailed 
distributions and ARCH effects than daily series. All indices are in logarithms and integrated of 
order one.  
Applying the Engle-Granger methodology (see table), bilateral cointegration is found for the 
stock indices of Egypt and the United States, as well as for Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. 
Israel’s Tel Aviv 25 Index is co-integrated with the S&P500, the Dow Jones Eurostoxx and the 
MSCI emerging markets index.
The Johansen procedure allows for multiple cointegrating vectors among the Mediterranean 
stock indices. Optimal lag length is chosen by standard criteria. The maximum eigenvalue 
statistic is used to determine the number of relevant cointegration relations. Among the seven 
Mediterranean stock markets for which data are available, one cointegration relation has been 
identiﬁ  ed. The exclusion test to determine that an individual index does not form part of this 
relationship can only be rejected for Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Thus, it is only between these 
three countries that the test ﬁ  nds ﬁ  nancial integration among Mediterranean stock markets. 
Next, the US, EU, MSCI EM and GCC indices are sequentially added to the vector of seven 
Mediterranean stock market indices. The exclusion restriction is not valid for the US, EU, 
and some GCC stock indices, indicating that these indices inﬂ  uence stock market movements in 
the Mediterranean. The number of co-integrating relations increases to two when the Eurostoxx, 49
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Corporate bond markets do not play a major role 
in most Mediterranean countries; accordingly, 
they have not been a relevant transmission 
mechanism for the effects of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil to the region. One exception is Israel. 
Local corporate bond markets have developed 
quickly in Israel since the major ﬁ  nancial sector 
reforms of the last few years. The reforms 
were aimed at developing capital markets 
and strengthening non-bank ﬁ   nancing of the 
corporate sector, and at increasing competition 
and foreign entry in the banking sector. 
As a result of the reforms, non-bank ﬁ  nancing 
via the corporate bond market has been very 
dynamic, as corporate bond issues have surged 
over the last few years, with both large and 
medium-sized companies tapping the market. 
By the end of 2007, non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions provided almost 50% of the business 
sector’s outstanding credit.
Severe strains have been visible in the Israeli 
corporate bond market in the wake of the global 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil. In 2008, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, bond yields shot up and 
the market dried up; the most severe effects 
were recorded by property companies that had 
exposure to foreign property markets. Yields 
decreased and new issuance became possible 
in the course of 2009, albeit mainly by larger 
companies with high ratings. In response to 
the corporate bond market turmoil, authorities 
temporarily suspended mark-to-market rules
for institutional investors under certain 
circumstances, and announced guarantees and 
Dubai or Saudi Tadawul stock indices are added, which shows that EU and GCC markets are 
particularly relevant for stock market developments in the region.
As evidenced by the econometric tests presented in this box, Mediterranean markets follow 
market developments in the United States and the EU. Regional recycling of oil revenues from 
GCC countries also appears to play a prominent role in some markets, particularly in Jordan. 
However, overall ﬁ  nancial integration between Mediterranean stock markets is relatively low. 
For Israel, price movements in advanced economies are more signiﬁ  cant than developments in 
the Mediterranean and the GCC. Moreover, Israeli stock markets are affected by developments 
in other emerging market economies.
Results from a cointegration analysis of weekly stock indices from 2000 to 2009
Bilateral cointegration 
relations  1)
Exclusion of country j from joint 
cointegrating vector 
Exclusion of country j from joint cointegrating vector 
with Mediterranean markets
(Pairings) Country  j Rejection 
probability  2)






Egypt  S&P500 (US)  Egypt  0.002  S&P500 (US)  0.000  1  2 
Israel S&P500  (US)  Israel 0.095  Eurostoxx 0.000  2  2 
Israel Eurostoxx  Jordan  0.046  MSCI EM  0.514  1  2 
Israel MSCI  EM  Lebanon  0.000  Abu Dhabi  0.508  1  1 
Jordan Saudi  Arabia  Morocco 0.729  Dubai 0.014  2  1 
Jordan Abu  Dhabi  Tunisia 0.847  Kuwait  0.419  1  1 
West Bank and Gaza  0.340 Oman  0.514  1  1 
Qatar 0.016 1 1
Saudi Arabia  0.006  2  2 
Sources: Bloomberg and ECB staff estimates. Data: week 1, 2000 to week 40, 2009. The data series for Abu Dhabi starts in week 38, 2001 
and for Dubai in week 13, 2000. 
Notes: Characters in italics indicate signiﬁ  cant cointegration relationships. 
1) The null hypothesis of no cointegration could be rejected at the 5% signiﬁ  cance level (Engle-Granger methodology). 
2) Probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that cointegration restrictions are binding i.e. β1, j = β2 , j = 0 (Johansen methodology). 
The cointegrating vector comprises seven Mediterranean economies. One cointegration relation has been identiﬁ  ed. 
3) Probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that cointegration restrictions are binding i.e. β1, j = β2 , j = 0 (Johansen  methodology). 
Country j has been added to the cointegrating vector with seven Mediterranean economies.50
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the establishment of several public-private funds 
to purchase bonds. This announcement instilled 
conﬁ  dence and contributed to an unfreezing of 
the market.
SOVEREIGN BOND AND CDS SPREADS
Sovereign bond spreads of Mediterranean 
countries increased moderately from 
August 2007 onwards and spiked sharply 
in September/October 2008, in line with 
developments in other emerging markets, 
in view of the intensiﬁ  cation of global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil and the increase in risk aversion 
(see Chart 46). Since the beginning of 2009, 
spreads have gradually come down, again in 
line with global developments. 
Notwithstanding this broad tracking of global 
patterns, country-speciﬁ  c developments in the 
Mediterranean are also worth noting. Lebanon 
exhibits the highest spread in the region, 
mirroring the country’s vulnerability, but the 
level still appears moderate in view of the very 
high public debt ﬁ   gures. This reﬂ  ects  the 
expectation of continued donor support and 
ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows from the Lebanese diaspora.21 
While in the past, Lebanon’s spread has always 
signiﬁ   cantly exceeded the emerging market 
average as a result of the country’s vulnerability, 
since autumn 2008 its level has been in line with 
the average. Accordingly, Lebanon’s position 
has improved, not in absolute but in relative 
terms, which reﬂ   ects the relatively heavier 
deterioration of the economic and ﬁ  scal situation 
in other emerging market economies in the wake 
of the crisis. Egypt and Tunisia’s sovereign 
spreads did not increase to the same extent as 
the emerging market average in autumn 2008 
and, in contrast to the emerging market average, 
in summer 2009 Egypt’s spread fell back to 
levels similar to those before the crisis.
These developments are also mirrored by CDS 
levels (see Chart 47). Lebanon’s CDS, while still 
the highest in the region, has now returned to pre-
crisis levels following a spike in autumn 2008 
See also Schimmelpfennig and Gardner (2008) on speciﬁ  c  21 
factors explaining why Lebanon had been able in the past to 
manage severe ﬁ   nancial pressures despite signiﬁ  cant  external 
vulnerabilities.
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and, unlike before the crisis, is now in line with 
the emerging market average. Israel’s CDS 
is relatively low and moved only moderately 
during the turmoil, but remains above pre-crisis 
levels. All in all, the development of sovereign 
bond and CDS levels in Mediterranean countries, 
while broadly following global developments, 
reﬂ  ects the fact that within the emerging market 
environment, the Mediterranean region has been 
less affected by the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil than 
other regions, for example central and eastern 
Europe, and the CIS countries.
INTERBANK MARKETS
While central banks in advanced economies 
had to intervene strongly in interbank (money) 
markets in the course of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, no comparable tensions were observable 
in Mediterranean countries (see Chart 48). 
Interbank lending rates broadly mirrored central 
bank policy rates, and spreads between interbank 
rates and central bank policy rates remained at 
normal levels. The rise in interbank lending rates 
observed in Egypt between January and October 
2008 can be attributed to increases in the central 
bank policy rate in response to rising inﬂ  ationary 
pressure (see Sub-section 2.3). The absence 
of major money market tensions in the region, 
despite liquidity conditions changing in several 
countries, is due to the fact (i) that interbank 
markets are not developed in several countries, 
(ii) that banking sectors in the region generally 
exhibit structural surplus liquidity, (iii) that 
banks in the region did not encounter problems 
similar to those in advanced economies, 
i.e. conﬁ   dence in counterparties’ ﬁ  nancial 
positions was not eroded, and (iv) that in small 
countries with a limited number of banks only 
a few players are active in interbank markets, 
and these players tend to know each other and 
the respective counterparty risks relatively well.
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
While the direct impact of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil on Mediterranean economies has been 
limited, the region was hit by the subsequent 
global recession, following years of robust 
economic performance that resulted from 
both a benign global backdrop and progress 
in structural reforms in many countries of the 
region. All countries in the region have been 
adversely affected by the crisis, but to varying 
degrees, and the region as a whole has been less 
affected than advanced economies and other 
emerging market regions, in particular central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe.
The major effects of global developments on the 
economies of the Mediterranean region have come 
through transmission channels associated with the 
real economy. Declines in exports, oil revenues, 
tourism revenues, remittances and FDI inﬂ  ows 
have been the major transmission channels, of 
which the drop in exports has been the strongest. 
As a result, real GDP growth in the region 
weakened signiﬁ  cantly in 2009 and is projected 
to recover only moderately in 2010. However, 
growth has remained positive in all countries of 
the region except Mauritania, and is also projected 
to be higher than in advanced economies and 
many other emerging market regions in 2010. 
A positive side effect of the global crisis 
throughout the region has been the signiﬁ  cant fall 
in inﬂ  ation, which had spiked in 2007 and 2008 
and which constituted the main macroeconomic 
challenge until mid-2008. The decline in global 
food prices has been a major factor in lowering 
inﬂ   ationary pressures, thereby supporting real 
incomes and private consumption. Most central 
banks in the region eased interest rates, and, in 
economies in which the interest rate transmission 
channel tends to be weak, central banks also cut 
reserve requirements. In contrast to several other 
emerging market economies, no major currency 
depreciations have been observed. 
Budget balances have weakened, most notably 
in oil-exporting countries as they maintained 
high levels of public expenditure to support 
economic activity amid a sharp drop in oil prices. 
In non-oil-exporting countries, ﬁ  scal  deﬁ  cits 
increased, but not as signiﬁ  cantly as in advanced 
economies, since the economic slowdown was 
less pronounced, as automatic stabilisers are 
relatively weak and as expenditure on oil and 
food subsidies declined, following the fall in 
global commodity prices. Large current account 
surpluses of the region’s major oil-exporting 
countries have plummeted as a result of the 
sharp drop in oil prices, while most non-oil-
exporting countries’ current account balances 
have remained broadly stable or have slightly 
strengthened.
A key factor explaining the relative resilience 
of Mediterranean economies is that the direct 
impact of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil on banking 
sectors and ﬁ  nancial markets in the region has 
been very limited, and thus, unlike in advanced 
and some other emerging market economies, 
negative feedback loops between the ﬁ  nancial 
sector and the real economy are largely absent.
The reasons for this limited spillover from global 
ﬁ   nancial developments to ﬁ   nancial sectors in 
the region are: (i) the almost complete lack of 
exposure of ﬁ   nancial institutions to mortgage-
related US securities that turned “toxic”; (ii) the 
generally limited integration of Mediterranean 
countries into global ﬁ   nancial markets, and 
(iii) the reliance of Mediterranean banks on 
domestic sources of funding and their limited 
links to banks in advanced economies.  
Nevertheless, some effects of the global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil on Mediterranean countries can be 
identiﬁ  ed. The most direct and immediate impact 
has been on stock markets in the region, which 
have been plummeting since mid-2008, broadly 
in line with global markets, owing to the increase 
in risk aversion and the weakening in support 
from regional oil revenue recycling. However, 
given the limited role of capital markets in most 
countries of the region, the impact on the overall 
economy should be limited.
The sharp fall in cross-border lending of 
BIS-reporting banks – a key feature of the 53
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“post-Lehman” global ﬁ   nancial landscape – 
has been less pronounced in Mediterranean 
countries than at the global level. In 
Mediterranean economies, as in most advanced 
and emerging market economies, a slowdown of 
credit extension to the private sector has been 
observable, which would appear to be a result 
of mainly the decrease in demand for credit in 
view of dampened economic prospects. At the 
same time, an increase in bank lending to the 
public sector has been seen in many countries. 
This increase in bank credit to the public 
sector can be attributed to the increased 
ﬁ   nancing requirements of governments – a 
result of the rise in ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits in the wake 
of the economic downturn. Moreover, in 
some countries foreign investors have largely 
withdrawn from domestic T-bill markets as a 
result of the general rise in risk aversion. Thus, 
governments have increasingly had to rely on 
domestic banks to fund their rising ﬁ  nancing 
requirements, which, if protracted, could lead 
to a crowding-out of private sector investment. 
In some countries, the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
has also had an adverse impact on privatisation 
plans in the banking sector.
Given the thus far limited overall impact of 
global ﬁ  nancial and economic developments on 
ﬁ  nancial sectors in the Mediterranean, the policy 
response has also been muted, in particular 
in comparison with the measures taken by 
advanced economies. 
Looking forward, the key risk for the region lies 
in the potentially weak and uneven recovery of 
the global economy. Economic developments 
in the EU are of particular importance, given 
the close economic and ﬁ   nancial links of 
most countries with the northern shore of 
the Mediterranean, and for some countries, 
developments in the GCC are also highly 
relevant. With regard to a scenario in which 
global economic activity remains weak over a 
protracted period, most countries in the region, in 
particular the non-oil-exporting countries, have 
hardly any room for manoeuvre in sustaining 
domestic demand with ﬁ   scal policy measures, 
owing to high debt levels. Furthermore, the 
means by which monetary policy can respond 
are limited, owing, inter alia, to the exchange 
rate regimes and the still relatively high inﬂ  ation 
levels in some countries. Moreover, while real 
GDP growth rates were positive – and higher 
than those in advanced economies and some 
other emerging market economies – in 2009, such 
subdued growth rates, if protracted, would not be 
sufﬁ  cient to address the signiﬁ  cant employment 
challenges that many Mediterranean countries 
face as a result of a rapidly growing labour force 
and already high unemployment levels over the 
medium term. In order to return to higher growth 
rates, foster investment and productivity and 
generate employment, further structural reforms 
remain crucial in areas such as governance, the 
business environment and the role of markets. 
As regards banking sectors, the indirect effects 
of the global recession on the real economy of 
Mediterranean countries may still be unfolding 
and result in a rise in non-performing loans. In 
several countries, an increase in non-performing 
loans would add to the legacy of an already 
large stock of impaired assets.
A major reason for the limited impact 
of the crisis on the region is the low degree 
of integration into global ﬁ  nancial markets and 
the lack of sophistication of banking sectors 
in many countries – therefore, a factor which 
has often been identiﬁ   ed as an impediment 
to economic development in the past has 
shielded countries from some of the spillovers 
of global ﬁ   nancial turmoil. This should 
not be taken, however, as an argument for 
maintaining the status quo and limiting further 
ﬁ   nancial sector reform. While the lessons of 
the global ﬁ   nancial crisis need to be taken 
into account when reforming the ﬁ  nancial 
sector, fostering ﬁ   nancial integration into the 
global and regional capital markets, as well as 
increased foreign participation, would enhance 
the efﬁ  ciency  of  ﬁ   nancial intermediation in 
the region and facilitate private sector access 
to capital, an issue which is still impeding 
investment and economic growth in many 
Mediterranean countries.54
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